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INTRODUCING THE TOTALLY 
UNNECESSARY BENEFIT LLC* 
MOHSEN MANESH** 
Unlike statutes authorizing benefit corporations, which have 
been recently enacted in over thirty states to accommodate social 
enterprises, no one has articulated a legal justification for benefit 
LLCs. Indeed, no plausible legal justification can be articulated. 
The expansive flexibility of conventional LLC law is already 
perfectly amenable to social enterprises. Instead, the advent of the 
benefit LLC, embraced most prominently by Delaware in 2018, 
plainly reveals what was arguably already apparent in the context 
of its corporate predecessor: that the aim of benefit entity statutes 
is not law reform. Rather, it is about branding. 
But the creation of this legislatively endorsed brand should raise 
serious concerns. In the absence of meaningful accountability 
measures to ensure that businesses embracing the statutory 
“benefit” label actually deserve it, the state-sanctioned “benefit” 
designation may be exploited by entrepreneurs to mislead the 
public and compete unfairly with conventional for-profit 
businesses. Moreover, even if statutory benefit entities do live up 
to their “benefit” aspiration, they impose their own costs by 
adding needless complexity to the law and exacerbating the 
popular misperception that conventional for-profit businesses are 
purely profit driven. It is hard to see why legislatures should 
employ state power for private gain in this way, especially where 
nongovernmental certifications already exist for socially minded, 
purpose-driven businesses seeking to distinguish themselves in 
the marketplace. Accordingly, this Article makes the case that 
statutory benefit entities—both corporations and especially 
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The rapid proliferation of state statutes authorizing so-called 
“benefit” corporations—starting with Maryland in 2010 and 
expanding to thirty-four states by 20181—has been premised in large 
 
 1. See B Lab, State by State Status of Legislation, BENEFIT CORP., 
http://benefitcorp.net/policymakers/state-by-state-status [https://perma.cc/NZ7K-7ENQ] 
[hereinafter B Lab, State by State]. 
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part on the assertion that conventional corporate law mandates 
shareholder primacy.2 Under this legal mandate, the board of 
directors of a for-profit corporation must manage the business solely 
for the benefit of its shareholders. With the aim of maximizing 
shareholder wealth as a board’s singular focus, concerns for other, 
nonshareholding stakeholders, the public, and the environment are 
irrelevant except to the extent such concerns implicate the 
corporation’s profits. 
Citing conventional corporate law’s mandate of shareholder 
primacy, advocates of benefit corporation legislation contend that the 
new statutory business form is a necessary and important addition to 
the existing legal landscape—one that accommodates for-profit 
businesses that are driven more by a social mission than a desire to 
maximize profits.3 For these purpose-driven “social enterprises,”4 the 
benefit corporation provides a legal framework that eschews 
conventional corporate law’s narrow focus on shareholder welfare. 
 
 2. Shareholder primacy can be understood in two different ways: (1) that the sole or 
primary objective of a business corporation is to advance the interests of its shareholders 
(i.e., to maximize shareholder wealth), or (2) that shareholders wield ultimate power in 
the governance of the corporation. See David G. Yosifon, The Law of Corporate Purpose, 
10 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 181, 184 n.4 (2013) [hereinafter Yosifon, Law of Corporate 
Purpose] (articulating this distinction); see also J. Haskell Murray, Choose Your Own 
Master: Social Enterprise, Certifications, and Benefit Corporation Statutes, 2 AM. U. BUS. 
L. REV. 1, 7 n.20 (2012) [hereinafter Murray, Choose Your Own Master] (same). This 
Article uses “shareholder primacy” in the former sense (i.e., that “shareholder primacy” 
means shareholder wealth maximization) rather than the latter. 
 3. See, e.g., FREDERICK H. ALEXANDER, BENEFIT CORPORATION LAW AND 
GOVERNANCE: PURSUING PROFIT WITH PURPOSE 1–6 (2017); WILLIAM H. CLARK, JR. 
ET AL., WHITE PAPER: THE NEED AND RATIONALE FOR THE BENEFIT CORPORATION 7–
8 (2013), http://benefitcorp.net/sites/default/files/Benefit_Corporation_White_Paper.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/FN9B-8FLC]; Bart Houlahan, Andrew Kassoy & Jay Coen Gilbert, Berle 
VIII: Benefit Corporations and the Firm Commitment Universe, 40 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 
299, 301 (2017). 
 4. There is no single agreed-upon definition of a “social enterprise,” and there are 
many different business models that might identify as such. See Alina S. Ball, Social 
Enterprise Governance, 18 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 919, 926–30 (2016) (surveying definitions of 
social enterprise); Alicia E. Plerhoples, Representing Social Enterprise, 20 CLINICAL L. 
REV. 215, 223–32 (2013) (describing different models of social enterprise). Generally 
speaking, however, a “social enterprise” describes “an entity that uses commercial activity 
to drive revenue with the common good as its primary purpose.” See J. Haskell Murray, 
Social Enterprise Innovation: Delaware’s Public Benefit Corporation Law, 4 HARV. BUS. 
L. REV. 345, 347–48 (2014) [hereinafter Murray, Social Enterprise Innovation]; see also 
Robert Katz & Anthony Page, The Role of Social Enterprise, 35 VT. L. REV. 59, 86 (2010) 
(defining “social enterprise” as a firm that seeks “to [produce and sell goods and services] 
in a manner that generates more public benefit or positive externalities than would a 
conventional for-profit firm [and] .	.	. expressly measures its success both in terms of its 
financial performance .	.	. and its success in advancing a social mission or addressing social 
concerns”). 
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Using benefit corporations, social enterprises may promote the 
interests of various nonshareholding constituencies, the public, and 
the environment, thus pursuing corporate profits more responsibly 
and sustainably, without fear of shareholder lawsuits or director 
liability.5 
However appealing this notion of corporate altruism might be, 
the legal justification for benefit corporations reflects a facile 
oversimplification of conventional corporate law. Conventional 
corporate law already enables purpose-driven businesses to pursue a 
social mission, even if doing so might curb a business’s ultimate 
profits.6 
But even if benefit corporations are legally unnecessary to 
accommodate social enterprises, the advent of benefit LLCs—the 
unincorporated analog to benefit corporations—proves that the 
question of legal necessity is ultimately irrelevant to the legislative 
movement that is spawning these new socially minded business forms. 
Benefit LLCs first emerged as a statutory business form in Maryland 
in 2010, at the same time as the first benefit corporation statute.7 
Unlike its corporate counterpart, however, the benefit LLC has 
languished in the intervening years,8 largely ignored by other states,9 
 
 5. See, e.g., William H. Clark, Jr. & Elizabeth K. Babson, How Benefit Corporations 
Are Redefining the Purpose of Business Corporations, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 817, 
819, 848 (2012). 
 6. See infra Section I.C. 
 7. See J. Haskell Murray, Beneficial Benefit LLCs?, 85 CIN. L. REV. 437, 437–38 
(2017) [hereinafter Murray, Beneficial Benefit LLCs?]. 
 8. Prior to 2018, only three states had enacted statutes authorizing benefit LLCs: 
Maryland (2010), Oregon (2013), and Pennsylvania (2016). See infra notes 205–09 and 
accompanying text. In 2018, Utah followed by Delaware both adopted benefit LLC 
statutes. See infra notes 205–09 and accompanying text. 
 9. Instead of benefit LLCs, Vermont, followed by eight other states, enacted statutes 
authorizing low-profit limited liability companies, or “L3Cs.” This novel statutory business 
form was intended to accommodate social enterprises by facilitating program-related 
investments from charitable foundations. See J. Haskell Murray, The Social Enterprise 
Law Market, 75 MD. L. REV. 541, 543–46 (2016) [hereinafter Murray, The Social 
Enterprise Law Market]. The poorly conceived legislation, however, did not comport with 
the relevant law governing charitable foundations and, thus, failed to accomplish its 
intended purpose. Carter G. Bishop, The Low-Profit LLC (L3C): Program Related 
Investment by Proxy or Perversion?, 63 ARK. L. REV. 243, 246 (2010); J. William Callison 
& Allan W. Vestal, The L3C Illusion: Why Low-Profit Limited Liability Companies Will 
Not Stimulate Socially Optimal Private Foundation Investment in Entrepreneurial Ventures, 
35 VT. L. REV. 273, 274 (2010); Daniel S. Kleinberger, A Myth Deconstructed: The 
“Emperor’s New Clothes” on the Low-Profit Limited Liability Company, 35 DEL. J. CORP. 
L. 879, 895–98 (2010). Once the shortcomings of the legislation were widely understood, 
state adoptions of L3C statutes ceased and one state—North Carolina—even repealed its 
authorizing legislation. Murray, The Social Enterprise Law Market, supra, at 544; see also 
DANA BRAKMAN REISER & STEVE A. DEAN, SOCIAL ENTERPRISE LAW: TRUST, PUBLIC 
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practitioners, and academics.10 But 2018 marked a significant turning 
point for the fledgling business form due to Delaware’s adoption of its 
own benefit LLC statute.11 Given that state’s unique importance in 
the business law world,12 one can now reasonably expect legislation 
and attendant interest in benefit LLCs to likewise flourish.13 
Yet, unlike benefit corporations, no one has attempted to 
articulate a plausible legal justification for benefit LLCs. No one has 
suggested that conventional LLC law mandates any form of “member 
primacy” or that conventional LLCs are somehow legally compelled 
to maximize profits. Instead, the unanimous consensus is that 
conventional LLC law already permits a business ample flexibility to 
commit itself to balancing or even subordinating profits against a 
social mission.14 Put differently, as a legal matter, benefit LLCs are 
inarguably unnecessary. 
Instead, the advent of benefit LLCs reveals that the animating 
force behind benefit entity legislation has never been a desire for 
legal reform. Rather it is about branding: the creation of a state-
sponsored designation made available to private entrepreneurs to 
signal the virtue of their for-profit business to consumers, investors, 
and the broader public.15 
But the creation of this state-sponsored brand should raise 
serious concerns about whether legislation authorizing benefit 
corporations and LLCs (collectively, “benefit entities”) is an 
appropriate or worthwhile use of state power. In the absence of any 
meaningful accountability measures to ensure that businesses 
embracing the statutory “benefit” label are actually deserving of it, 
the state-sponsored “benefit” brand may be exploited by 
entrepreneurs to mislead the public and compete unfairly with 
 
BENEFIT AND CAPITAL MARKETS 62–64 (2017). At present, the L3C form appears to be 
at a “dead end” and a cautionary tale for benefit entity legislation. 
 10. As of 2018, the only published scholarly article to focus specifically on benefit 
LLCs is a symposium piece. See generally Murray, Beneficial Benefit LLCs?, supra note 7. 
 11. See Act of July 23, 2018, ch. 357, 81 Del. Laws __ (codified at DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 
6, §§	18-1201 to -1208 (Supp. 2018)). 
 12. See infra text accompanying notes 59–62. 
 13. See REISER & DEAN, supra note 9, at 65 (“Delaware’s dominance in the market 
for for-profit incorporations may not spill over into the hybrid form space, but one should 
certainly not underestimate its influence.”); Michael B. Dorff, Why Public Benefit 
Corporations?, 42 DEL. J. CORP. L. 77, 83–84 (2017) [hereinafter Dorff, Why Public 
Benefit Corporations?] (noting the influence of Delaware’s embrace of benefit 
corporations on other states). 
 14. See infra Section II.B. 
 15. See infra notes 248–57 and accompanying text. 
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conventional for-profit businesses.16 It is hard to see why legislatures 
should employ state power for private gain in this way, especially 
where there already exist private certifications available to socially 
minded businesses seeking to distinguish themselves in the 
marketplace.17 
Moreover, even if statutory benefit entities do, in fact, live up to 
their “benefit” aspiration, they impose their own costs by adding 
needless complexity to the law and exacerbating the popular 
misperception that conventional for-profit businesses are purely 
profit driven.18 The unintended result may be that conventional for-
profit businesses retreat from socially minded initiatives, resulting 
ironically in a net decrease in the public benefit arising from private 
enterprises. 
Alas, state legislatures are unlikely to revisit their recently 
enacted benefit corporation statutes any time soon. The benefit LLC, 
however, presents a second opportunity to consider the rationale and 
need for a new statutory business form catering to social enterprises. 
A sober assessment suggests this seemingly innocuous legislation is 
both unnecessary as a legal matter and unwise as a policy matter. 
The remainder of this Article proceeds in three parts. Part I 
describes statutory benefit corporations, the legal explanation offered 
to justify their existence, and the many frailties in that explanation. 
Part II then moves on to statutory benefit LLCs, highlighting the 
complete absence of a legal justification for them. Having 
demonstrated that both types of benefit entities are legally 
unnecessary to accommodate social enterprises, Part III makes the 
policy case against them, focusing on the lack of accountability and 
the costs associated with the state-created “benefit” designation as 
well as the availability of private branding as an alternative to state-
sponsored branding. 
I.  BENEFIT CORPORATIONS 
The hasty adoption of benefit corporation statutes by state 
legislatures can be largely credited to a single Philadelphia-based 
nonprofit, B Lab.19 Before benefit corporations, B Lab was best 
 
 16. See infra Section III.A. 
 17. See infra Section III.C. 
 18. See infra Section III.B. 
 19. See Mark J. Loewenstein, Benefit Corporation Law, 85 CIN. L. REV. 381, 382 
(2017) [hereinafter Loewenstein, Benefit Corporation Law] (“The widespread adoption of 
benefit corporation legislation and the influence of the Model [Benefit Corporation] 
Legislation on that legislation are testaments to the successful efforts of B Lab.”); Murray, 
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known for its private “B Corporation” certification,20 a designation 
the nonprofit awards to socially minded businesses that achieve a 
qualifying score on B Lab’s proprietary B Impact Assessment.21 Like 
LEED certification for buildings, “B Corporation” certification is 
intended to communicate certain virtuous attributes about a business 
to various internal and external constituencies.22 Building upon its 
private B Corporation brand,23 in 2010, B Lab promulgated the 
Model Benefit Corporation Legislation (“MBCL”),24 which first 
conceived of the benefit corporation as a statutory business form.25 
Section A describes statutory benefit corporations as envisioned 
under the MBCL and its primary competitor, the Delaware public 
 
Social Enterprise Innovation, supra note 4, at 348, 369 (“The non-profit organization B Lab 
has been the major force behind the passing of these benefit corporation statutes. .	.	. B 
Lab has become a vocal, connected, persistent, and well-funded advocate for the Model 
[Benefit Corporation Legislation].”); see also Mark J. Loewenstein, Benefit Corporations: 
A Challenge in Corporate Governance, 68 BUS. LAW. 1007, 1012–13 (2013) [hereinafter 
Loewenstein, Benefit Corporations: A Challenge] (providing background information on B 
Lab). 
 20. See Loewenstein, Benefit Corporations: A Challenge, supra note 19, at 1012–13; 
Murray, Choose Your Own Master, supra note 2, at 21–22. 
 21. See Michael B. Dorff, Assessing the Assessment: B Lab’s Effort to Measure 
Companies’ Benevolence, 40 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 515, 523–26 (2017) [hereinafter Dorff, 
Assessing the Assessment] (describing B Corporation certification using the B Impact 
Assessment); Kevin V. Tu, Socially Conscious Corporations and Shareholder Profit, 84 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 121, 149–51 (2016) (same). The B Impact Assessment measures a 
business along four dimensions: (1) the extent to which the business’s prosocial 
commitment is engrained in its internal governance, (2) the business’s treatment of its 
employees, (3) the business’s impact upon the communities in which it operates, and (4) 
the business’s environmental practices and policies. See Dorff, Assessing the Assessment, 
supra, at 523–25. 
 22. See B Lab, About B Corps, CERTIFIED B CORP., https://www.bcorporation.net/what-
are-b-corps [https://perma.cc/9LFR-ZP6U]; see also Loewenstein, Benefit Corporations: A 
Challenge, supra note 19, at 1013; Tu, supra note 21, at 151. 
 23. In a recent interview, the founders of B Lab explained that, from the outset, their 
intent with B Corporation certification was to build a community of advocates in the 
business world to provide political support for benefit corporation statutes. Larry 
Hamermesh et al., A Conversation with B Lab, 40 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 321, 329–30 (2017). 
 24. MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. (2017), https://benefitcorp.net/sites/default/files/
Model%20benefit%20corp%20legislation%20_4_17_17.pdf [https://perma.cc/W55T-SPDS]. 
As Professor Loewenstein notes, unlike other widely adopted model legislation, the 
MBCL was drafted largely by one attorney, Bill Clark, for his client B Lab, and it did not 
benefit from vetting by informed groups like the American Law Institute. See 
Loewenstein, Benefit Corporation Law, supra note 19, at 383. 
 25. Because B Lab chose a moniker for the new statutory business form, “benefit 
corporation,” that sounds confusingly similar to its private B Corporation certification, the 
statutory business form and the private certification are often conflated. See Tu, supra 
note 21, at 143 (noting the persistent confusion between certified B Corporations and 
statutory benefit corporations). Regrettably, both Certified B corporations and statutory 
benefit corporations are both sometimes referred to as “B Corps,” which only exacerbates 
the confusion. See Murray, Choose Your Own Master, supra note 2, at 21. 
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benefit corporation statute. Section B then describes the legal 
justification asserted by B Lab and others for the new business form. 
Finally, Section C synthesizes a significant body of legal scholarship 
demonstrating that this asserted justification—premised on the notion 
that conventional corporate law mandates unflinching shareholder 
primacy—fails to withstand close scrutiny. 
A. Benefit Corporation Statutes 
Today’s benefit corporation statutes can be roughly divided into 
two categories: those that follow B Lab’s MBCL and those that follow 
Delaware’s lead. Although the two statutes have some important 
differences, both share the same essential aim. Both statutes 
authorize a new type of for-profit business corporation whose 
purpose is not simply to maximize profits for the benefit of its 
shareholders but instead balances profit seeking with the 
advancement of “public benefit” or social good.26 
1.  B Lab Model 
As drafted, the MBCL is designed to be embedded into a state’s 
existing business corporation statute, adding provisions that authorize 
the creation and governance of a new type of corporate entity—a 
benefit corporation.27 Because it is merely a subtype of corporation, a 
benefit corporation is subject to all other provisions of a state’s 
existing corporation statute, except where those provisions are 
modified or supplanted by the MBCL.28 
Under the MBCL, every “benefit corporation shall have a 
purpose of creating general public benefit.”29 “General public 
benefit” is, in turn, defined to mean “[a] material positive impact on 
society and the environment.”30 By mandating “[a] material positive 
impact on society and the environment,” the MBCL statutorily 
 
 26. See MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. §	101 cmt. (2017), https://benefitcorp.net/sites/
default/files/Model%20benefit%20corp%20legislation%20_4_17_17.pdf [https://perma.cc/
W55T-SPDS] (“This chapter authorizes the organization of a form of business corporation 
that offers entrepreneurs and investors the option to build, and invest in, a business that 
operates with a corporate purpose broader than maximizing shareholder value and that 
consciously undertakes a responsibility to maximize the benefits of its operations for all 
stakeholders, not just shareholders.”); see also Act of July 23, 2018, ch. 357, 81 Del. Laws 
__ (codified at DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§	18-1201 to -1208 (Supp. 2018)). 
 27. See MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. §§	101(a), 103 (2017), https://benefitcorp.net/
sites/default/files/Model%20benefit%20corp%20legislation%20_4_17_17.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/W55T-SPDS]. 
 28. See id. §	101(c). 
 29. Id. §	201(a). 
 30. Id. §	102. 
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enshrines the prosocial mission of every benefit corporation 
organized under the statute. 
In addition to creating “general public benefit,” a benefit 
corporation may, but is not required to, identify in its articles of 
incorporation an additional purpose of creating one or more “specific 
public benefits.”31 In contrast to the mandatory “general public 
benefit” purpose, the optional “specific public benefit” purpose 
provides an opportunity for each benefit corporation to articulate a 
more particularized prosocial mission that is focused and concrete.32 
But the MBCL also makes clear that any “specific public benefit” 
identified in a benefit corporation’s articles does not displace the 
“general public benefit” purpose statutorily required of all benefit 
corporations.33 
To operationalize the public benefit purpose of benefit 
corporations, the MBCL prescribes a standard of conduct applicable 
to the board of directors, who are charged with managing the business 
and affairs of the benefit corporation.34 Specifically, the MBCL 
requires that the board of directors, in discharging its managerial 
duties, “shall consider the effects of any [corporate] action or inaction 
upon” a wide range of constituencies, including the corporation’s 
shareholders, employees, suppliers, and customers, the communities 
in which the corporation operates, and even the local and global 
environment.35 
This statutory mandate is considered the “heart” of the MBCL.36 
By requiring directors “to consider” the interests of not only 
shareholders but also of multiple nonshareholding constituencies, the 
MBCL expressly rejects any notion of shareholder primacy.37 Instead, 
directors of a benefit corporation are statutorily required to place 
shareholder interests on equal footing with the interests of other 
corporate stakeholders, the broader public, and the environment, 
 
 31. Id. §	201(b); see also id. §	102 (defining “specific public benefit”). 
 32. See ALEXANDER, supra note 3, at 74–75. 
 33. §	201(b). 
 34. See id. §	301(a); see also id. §	303(a) (applying the same standard of conduct to 
corporate officers). 
 35. Id. §	301(a). 
 36. Id. §	301 cmt. (“This section is at the heart of what it means to be a benefit 
corporation.”). 
 37. Id. (“By requiring the consideration of interests of constituencies other than the 
shareholders, the [MBCL] rejects the holdings in Dodge v. Ford and eBay v. Newmark 
that directors must maximize the financial value of a corporation.” (citations omitted)). 
97 N.C. L. REV. 603 (2019) 
612 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 97 
with an ultimate aim of creating public benefit from the corporation’s 
for-profit activities.38 
Importantly, however, nonshareholding stakeholders have no 
legal means of actually ensuring that the directors of a benefit 
corporation do any of this.39 Nonshareholders have no say in who sits 
on a benefit corporation’s board of directors.40 Nor do they have 
standing to sue those directors to enforce the board’s statutory 
duties.41 Indeed, the MBCL is explicit that “[a] director [of a benefit 
corporation] does not have a duty to a person that is a beneficiary of 
the general public benefit purpose or a specific public benefit purpose 
of [the] benefit corporation.”42 
Instead, like the directors of a conventional corporation, the 
directors of a benefit corporation are accountable only to the 
shareholders of the business.43 The MBCL does not alter the 
conventional corporate law framework that grants shareholders—and 
not any other constituency—the exclusive franchise to elect the 
corporation’s board.44 Moreover, under the MBCL, only shareholders 
 
 38. See ALEXANDER, supra note 3, at 70. 
 39. See id. at 94–95 (acknowledging that nonshareholders “have no voice” in benefit 
corporations); J. Haskell Murray, An Early Report on Benefit Reports, 118 W. VA. L. REV. 
25, 44 (2015) [hereinafter Murray, An Early Report on Benefit Reports] (“[T]he vast 
majority of stakeholders that the benefit corporation statute requires directors to consider 
are relatively helpless in enforcing their rights.”). The lack of stakeholder power in benefit 
corporations has been memorably described as creating a “separation of benefit and 
control.” Emily Winston, Benefit Corporations and the Separation of Benefit and Control, 
39 CARDOZO L. REV. 1783, 1788, 1820–21 (2018). 
 40. See MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. §	101(c) (2017), https://benefitcorp.net/sites/
default/files/Model%20benefit%20corp%20legislation%20_4_17_17.pdf [https://perma.cc/
W55T-SPDS] (providing that a state’s conventional corporation law governs matters that 
are not otherwise addressed in the MBCL, like the election of directors by shareholder 
vote). 
 41. See id. §	305(c). 
 42. Id. §	301(d) (emphasis added). 
 43. See Justin Blount & Kwabena Offei-Danso, The Benefit Corporation: A 
Questionable Solution to a Non-Existent Problem, 44 ST. MARY’S L.J. 617, 639–40 (2013) 
(“[E]ven though it expressly disavows shareholder primacy .	.	.	, the MBCL retains much 
of the existing corporate structure by leaving ultimate accountability in the hands of the 
shareholders .	.	.	.”); Dana Brakman Reiser, Benefit Corporations—A Sustainable Form of 
Organization?, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 591, 612 (2011) (“Shareholders of all benefit 
corporations retain the informational, voting, and litigation rights of ordinary 
shareholders.”); Leo E. Strine, Jr., Making It Easier for Directors to “Do the Right 
Thing”?, 4 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 235, 245 (2014) [hereinafter Strine, Making It Easier for 
Directors] (describing this aspect of the benefit corporation movement as “incremental” 
and “inherently conservative”). 
 44. §	101(c). 
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have the right to sue the directors for breach of their statutory duties 
via a lawsuit called a “benefit enforcement proceeding.”45 
Rather than accountability, the MBCL offers nonshareholding 
stakeholders a disclosure regime to ensure that benefit corporations 
fulfill their statutory purpose. Specifically, under the MBCL, every 
benefit corporation is required to prepare and make publicly 
available an annual benefit report.46 In that report, the corporation 
must provide a narrative description of the ways it pursued and 
created general public benefit and any applicable specific public 
benefit during the preceding year.47 In addition, the report must 
assess the corporation’s overall environmental and social 
performance against the standards of an independent third party.48 A 
cynical mind will be quick to remember that B Lab, the architect and 
chief advocate behind the MBCL, also provides such standards 
through its B Impact Assessment.49 Indeed, the MBCL’s definition of 
“third-party standard” is drafted in a way that “seems tailor-made for 
B Lab,”50 although other third-party standards may also qualify under 
the statute.51 
Through forceful lobbying,52 and without organized political 
opposition, B Lab has been enormously successful in convincing 
 
 45. See id. §	102 (defining “benefit enforcement proceeding”); id. §	305(c) (identifying 
the benefit corporation and shareholders as the only parties with standing to bring a 
benefit enforcement proceeding). A shareholder’s right to bring a benefit enforcement 
proceeding is further restricted by the statutory requirement that the shareholder must 
hold a sufficient percentage of the corporation’s outstanding shares. See id. §	305(c)(2)(i)–
(ii). 
 46. See id. §§	401, 402(b). 
 47. See id. §	401(a)(1)(i)–(ii). 
 48. See id. §	401(a)(2); see also id. §	102 (defining “third-party standard”). 
 49. Although B Lab’s assessment tool is free to use by any benefit corporation, to 
earn B Lab’s B Corporation certification, the corporation must earn a qualifying score on 
the assessment, be prepared to provide B Lab supporting documentation, and, of course, 
pay B Lab a fee, ranging from $500 to $50,000 annually based on the corporation’s 
revenues. Dorff, Assessing the Assessment, supra note 21, at 518; B Lab, Certification, 
CERTIFIED B CORP., https://bcorporation.net/certification [https://perma.cc/X7Q5-66U5]. 
 50. See Reiser, supra note 43, at 602. 
 51. See §	102 (defining “third-party standard” to be any “recognized standard for 
reporting overall social and environmental performance of a business that is” 
comprehensive, independent, credible, and transparent). Despite the fact that other third-
party standards could qualify under the MBCL, in practice, B Lab’s standards appear to 
be the most commonly used standards. See Winston, supra note 39, at 1804. 
 52. See Loewenstein, Benefit Corporation Law, supra note 19, at 382 n.7 (describing 
the author’s experience with B Lab and its affiliates in the author’s capacity as a member 
of the Colorado Bar Association Business Law Section while considering benefit 
corporation legislation); see also J. William Callison, Benefit Corporations, Innovation, and 
Statutory Design, 26 REGENT U. L. REV. 143, 159–63 (2013) [hereinafter Callison, Benefit 
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states to embrace its no-cost, feel-good legislation.53 The first benefit 
corporation statute, based on the MBCL, was enacted by Maryland in 
2010.54 As of 2018, over thirty states have followed suit, adopting the 
MBCL,55 although with some variations.56 And more states are 
expected to join the bandwagon soon.57 
2.  Delaware Model 
The chief alternative to the MBCL is Delaware’s benefit 
corporation statute.58 The central importance of Delaware to 
corporate law is well known.59 Over sixty percent of the Fortune 500 
are organized under Delaware law.60 The state’s courts—especially its 
Court of Chancery—have a national and international reputation for 
sophistication in business law.61 And because so many businesses are 
organized under Delaware law, the state has an enormous and ever-
growing body of judicial precedent, addressing a variety of novel 
factual and legal issues, giving the state’s law the perception of 
certainty and predictability.62 
 
Corporations] (describing the same and characterizing the experiences as “fairly 
acrimonious”). 
 53. See Callison, Benefit Corporations, supra note 52, at 146 (describing B Lab’s 
lobbying efforts as “well-financed and well-organized”); Brett McDonnell, Benefit 
Corporations and Strategic Action Fields or (the Existential Failing of Delaware), 39 
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 263, 282–83 (2016) (describing the political dynamics that have led to 
the widespread adoption of benefit corporation statutes); Murray, The Social Enterprise 
Law Market, supra note 9, at 580 (describing the political motivations for legislatures to 
adopt benefit corporation statutes). 
 54. Act of Apr. 13, 2010, ch. 97, 2010 Md. Laws 980 (codified as amended at MD. 
CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS §§	5-6C-01 to -08) (LEXIS through 2018 Reg. Sess.)). 
 55. See B Lab, State by State, supra note 1. 
 56. See, e.g., Murray, An Early Report on Benefit Reports, supra note 39, at 31–32 
(describing state law variation on provisions governing benefit reports). 
 57. See B Lab, State by State, supra note 1 (identifying several states in which benefit 
corporation legislation is in progress). 
 58. REISER & DEAN, supra note 9, at 66 (describing Delaware’s statute as a “potent 
rival” to the MBCL). 
 59. See, e.g., Brian J. Broughman, Jesse M. Fried & Darian M. Ibrahim, Delaware 
Law as Lingua Franca: Theory and Evidence, 57 J.L. & ECON. 865, 865 (2014); William J. 
Carney & George B. Shepherd, The Mystery of Delaware Law’s Continuing Success, 2009 
U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 2; Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, Price Discrimination in the Market for 
Corporate Law, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1205, 1212 (2001). 
 60. Press Release, Jeffrey W. Bullock, Del. Sec’y of State, A Message from the 
Secretary of State, https://corp.delaware.gov/stats/ [https://perma.cc/MX5X-E3HM]. 
 61. See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, The Peculiar Role of the Delaware Courts in the Competition 
for Corporate Charters, 68 CIN. L. REV. 1061, 1077–78 (2000); William Savitt, The Genius 
of the Modern Chancery System, 2012 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 570, 570. 
 62. See, e.g., Kahan & Kamar, supra note 59, at 1212; Mohsen Manesh, Delaware and 
the Market for LLC Law: A Theory of Contractibility and Legal Indeterminacy, 52 B.C. L. 
REV. 189, 211–16 (2011) [hereinafter Manesh, Delaware and the Market for LLC Law]. 
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When B Lab approached Delaware to adopt benefit corporation 
legislation, rather than simply embrace the MBCL, the state’s 
lawmaking organs instead drafted their own legislation.63 The 
resulting Delaware Public Benefit Corporation statute was adopted in 
2013.64 Given Delaware’s influence in the business law world, it is 
unsurprising that other states—including Colorado, Kansas, 
Kentucky, Tennessee, and Minnesota—have since adopted some or 
all aspects of Delaware’s statute.65 
Despite some technical and terminological differences—for 
example, referring to benefit corporations as “public benefit 
corporation[s]”66—the Delaware statute is largely in accord with the 
MBCL. Similar to the MBCL, which provides that the purpose of a 
benefit corporation is to create “[a] material positive impact on 
society and the environment,”67 the Delaware statute states that a 
public benefit corporation is one “that is intended to produce a public 
benefit .	.	. and to operate in a responsible and sustainable manner.”68 
Likewise, the Delaware statute, in accord with the MBCL, requires 
the board of directors of a public benefit corporation to manage the 
business in a manner that accounts for the interests of not only the 
shareholders but also all nonshareholding constituencies materially 
affected by the corporation’s activities.69 Thus, like the MBCL, the 
Delaware statute contemplates a for-profit business that is also 
socially minded. 
 
 63. See ALEXANDER, supra note 3, at 2–3, 86 (describing the deliberation and 
drafting process in Delaware). 
 64. See Act of July 17, 2013, ch. 122, §	8, 79 Del. Laws 1, 2–4 (codified as amended at 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§	361–368 (2016 & Supp. 2018)). 
 65. See ALEXANDER, supra note 3, at 87 (identifying Colorado, Kansas, Kentucky, 
and Tennessee as states following Delaware’s approach); Murray, The Social Enterprise 
Law Market, supra note 9, at 553 (identifying Colorado and Minnesota as states following 
Delaware’s approach). 
 66. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §	362(a) (2016) (emphasis added). 
 67. MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. §	201(a) (2017), https://benefitcorp.net/sites/
default/files/Model%20benefit%20corp%20legislation%20_4_17_17.pdf [https://perma.cc/
W55T-SPDS] (prescribing the purpose of a benefit corporation); id. §	102 (defining 
“general public benefit”). 
 68. See tit. 8, §	362(a). Although Delaware’s statute does not use the expression 
“general public benefit,” its open-ended mandate for benefit corporations to “operate in a 
responsible and sustainable manner” is analogous to the MBCL’s mandate for benefit 
corporations to pursue “general public benefit,” which the MBCL defines as “a material 
positive impact on society and the environment.” §	102. 
 69. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §	365(a) (2016) (“The board of directors shall manage 
.	.	. the public benefit corporation in a manner that balances the pecuniary interests of the 
stockholders, the best interests of those materially affected by the corporation’s conduct, 
and the specific public benefit or public benefits identified in its certificate of 
incorporation.”). 
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The chief deviations of the Delaware statute from the MBCL 
relate to specific public benefits and the rules regarding benefit 
reports. First, unlike the MBCL, under which the pursuit of a specific 
public benefit is an optional purpose,70 Delaware’s statute mandates 
that each benefit corporation designate in its corporate charter a 
specific public benefit that the corporation will produce.71 The 
requirement of a specific public benefit under the Delaware statute is 
intended to provide more focus and guidance and, perhaps, create 
more accountability for directors,72 as compared to the requirement of 
general public benefit under the MBCL, which is defined so broadly 
as to be arguably meaningless and, therefore, unenforceable.73 
Second, the Delaware statute deviates from the MBCL’s rules 
regarding a corporation’s benefit report. Under the Delaware statute, 
a benefit report may be prepared biennially (rather than annually)74 
and made available to the shareholders only (rather than made 
publicly available).75 More importantly, the Delaware statute 
dispenses with the MBCL’s requirement that a benefit report must 
assess the corporation’s activities against the standards of a third 
 
 70. See MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. §	201(b) (2017), https://benefitcorp.net/sites/
default/files/Model%20benefit%20corp%20legislation%20_4_17_17.pdf [https://perma.cc/
W55T-SPDS]. 
 71. See tit. 8, §	362(a) (“In the certificate of incorporation, a public benefit 
corporation shall .	.	. [i]dentify within its statement of business or purpose .	.	. 1 or more 
specific public benefits to be promoted by the corporation .	.	.	.”); id. §	362(b) (defining 
“public benefit” to mean “a positive effect (or reduction of negative effects) on 1 or more 
categories of persons, entities, communities or interests (other than stockholders in their 
capacities as stockholders)”). 
 72. See ALEXANDER, supra note 3, at 91 (“[T]he requirement of specificity was an 
acknowledgment that creating accountability with respect to broad public benefit was a 
difficult proposition .	.	.	. Though the specific benefit requirement does not relax the 
general requirements, it does potentially supply a more meaningful opportunity to hold a 
corporation accountable for public benefit.”); Murray, Social Enterprise Innovation, supra 
note 4, at 355–56 (“Delaware moved in the direction of more directorial guidance by 
requiring [benefit corporations] to choose a specific public benefit purpose .	.	.	. [This] will 
likely aid directors in decision-making and may .	.	. create some level of accountability for 
directors.”). 
 73. See infra notes 264–68 and accompanying text. 
 74. Compare DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §	366(b) (2016) (requiring a benefit report “no 
less than biennially”), with MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. §	401(a) (2017), 
https://benefitcorp.net/sites/default/files/Model%20benefit%20corp%20legislation%20_4_
17_17.pdf [https://perma.cc/W55T-SPDS] (requiring “an annual benefit report”). 
 75. Compare tit. 8, §	366(b) (requiring a benefit report to be provided to 
stockholders), with MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. §	402(a), (c) (2017), 
https://benefitcorp.net/sites/default/files/Model%20benefit%20corp%20legislation%20_4_
17_17.pdf [https://perma.cc/W55T-SPDS] (requiring a benefit report to be provided to 
shareholders and made available publicly). 
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party,76 allowing a board to define its own standard by which to assess 
the business’s creation of public benefit.77 If a Delaware public benefit 
corporation wishes to provide a benefit report annually, to make that 
report available publicly, or to assess itself against third-party 
standards, the corporation is free to do so.78 However, unlike the 
MBCL, none of these things are mandatory under Delaware’s benefit 
corporation statute. 
B. Legal Justification for Benefit Corporations 
Advocates of benefit corporation legislation—whether pursuant 
to the MBCL or the Delaware statute—have strongly emphasized the 
legal need for the new statutory business form.79 Conventional 
corporate law, B Lab and others have argued, requires the directors 
of a corporation to maximize profits for the sole benefit of its 
shareholders.80 This legal constraint—to privilege the financial 
interests of the shareholders above all else—hinders socially minded 
entrepreneurs from operating a for-profit business responsibly and 
sustainably, in a manner that is attentive to the good of other 
stakeholders, society, and the environment.81 This view of 
conventional corporate law, as mandating shareholder primacy, has 
been espoused not only by the advocates of benefit corporation 
legislation but by many corporate law scholars,82 as well as some 
jurists.83   
Of course, no one can point to a statutory provision that bluntly 
commands a conventional corporation to maximize the wealth of its 
shareholders or otherwise precludes corporate directors from 
considering or advancing the interests of nonshareholding 
 
 76. Compare DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §	366(c)(3) (2016) (allowing for an optional 
assessment against the standards of a third party), with MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. 
§	401(a)(2) (2017), https://benefitcorp.net/sites/default/files/Model%20benefit%20corp%
20legislation%20_4_17_17.pdf [https://perma.cc/W55T-SPDS] (requiring an assessment 
against the standards of a third party). 
 77. See tit. 8, §	366(b). 
 78. See id. tit. 8, §	366(c)(1), (3). 
 79. See, e.g., CLARK ET AL., supra note 3, at 1; Clark & Babson, supra note 5, at 851. 
 80. See, e.g., ALEXANDER, supra note 3, at 22–24, 26–29; CLARK ET AL., supra note 3, 
at 7–11; Clark & Babson, supra note 5, at 825–34. 
 81. See, e.g., CLARK ET AL., supra note 3, at 14 (asserting that “[b]ased on the 
established .	.	. legal frameworks, directors face legal uncertainty”). 
 82. See, e.g., STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW 157 (3d ed. 2015); 
Yosifon, Law of Corporate Purpose, supra note 2, at 183. 
 83. See infra text accompanying notes 103–06. 
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constituencies. Indeed, no such statutory provision exists.84 Instead, 
advocates of benefit corporation legislation commonly point to three 
judicial precedents interpreting and applying the fiduciary duties 
owed by the directors of a corporation.85 Advocates assert these three 
precedents demonstrate that conventional corporate law commands 
directors to advance solely the interests of shareholders or otherwise 
face shareholder lawsuits and the threat of legal liability for breach of 
fiduciary duty.86 
The first precedent is the 1919 decision of the Michigan Supreme 
Court, Dodge v. Ford,87 involving a dispute between the controlling 
and minority shareholders of Ford Motor Company.88 To justify 
withholding dividends from the minority shareholders, the controlling 
shareholder, Henry Ford, argued that his namesake company would 
rather use its surplus cash to benefit its employees and society more 
broadly.89 In rejecting Ford’s assertion, the Michigan Supreme Court 
announced: 
A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily 
for the profit of the stockholders. The powers of the directors 
are to be employed for that end. The discretion of directors is 
to be exercised in the choice of means to attain that end, and 
does not extend to a change in the end itself .	.	.	.90 
The second commonly cited precedent is the 1984 case Revlon, 
Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.91 Seeking to avoid a 
hostile takeover of the popular cosmetics company, Revlon’s board of 
directors adopted various defensive measures, justifying them as 
protecting the interests of Revlon’s creditors.92 In enjoining the 
actions of Revlon’s board, the Delaware Supreme Court observed 
that as a general matter, “[a] board may have regard for various 
[nonstockholder] constituencies in discharging its responsibilities, 
 
 84. See Joan MacLeod Heminway, Shareholder Wealth Maximization as a Function of 
Statutes, Decisional Law, and Organic Documents, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 939, 947–49 
(2017) [hereinafter Heminway, Shareholder Wealth Maximization]; Yosifon, Law of 
Corporate Purpose, supra note 2, at 185–87. 
 85. See, e.g., ALEXANDER, supra note 3, at 22–28 (discussing Dodge, Revlon, and 
eBay); CLARK ET AL., supra note 3, at 7–13 (same); Clark & Babson, supra note 5, at 825–
38 (same). 
 86. See ALEXANDER, supra note 3, at 22. 
 87. 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919). 
 88. See id. at 670–71. 
 89. See id. at 671. 
 90. Id. at 684. 
 91. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986). 
 92. See id. at 180–82. 
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provided there are rationally related benefits accruing to the 
stockholders.”93 Thus, the Delaware Supreme Court recognized that 
corporate directors are not barred from considering the interests of 
nonshareholders (like debtholders), but those interests must be 
viewed through a prism of shareholder primacy—namely, whether 
advancing nonshareholder interests would ultimately benefit the 
shareholders of the corporation.94 Even then, however, the court 
added that in the unique context involving a sale or change or control 
of the company, “such concern for non-stockholder interests is 
inappropriate.”95 In that unique context, the court held the board has 
a singular duty: “the maximization of the company’s value at a sale 
for the stockholders’ benefit.”96 
Finally, advocates commonly cite the 2010 decision of the 
Delaware Chancery Court in eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. 
Newmark,97 involving a dispute between the controlling and minority 
shareholders of the online classifieds company Craigslist.98 The two 
controlling shareholders of Craigslist took various defensive measures 
to protect the company’s community-oriented corporate culture from 
its profit-seeking minority shareholder eBay.99 In eBay, the chancellor 
rejected the controlling shareholders’ actions, reasoning that 
[t]he corporate form in which craigslist operates .	.	. is not an 
appropriate vehicle for purely philanthropic ends .	.	.	. Having 
chosen a for-profit corporate form, the craigslist directors are 
bound by the fiduciary duties and standards that accompany 
that form. Those standards include acting to promote the value 
of the corporation for the benefit of its stockholders.100 
B Lab and others argue these three precedents evince the reality 
that it is a bedrock principle of conventional corporate law that a 
corporation, and the directors who manage it, must solely pursue the 
financial interests of the corporation’s shareholders.101 Any concern 
 
 93. Id. at 182 (citing Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 
1985)). 
 94. See id. 
 95. Id. (emphasis added). 
 96. Id. 
 97. 16 A.3d 1 (Del. Ch. 2010). 
 98. See id. at 6–7. 
 99. See id. at 6. 
 100. Id. at 34. 
 101. See, e.g., ALEXANDER, supra note 3, at 26–31; CLARK ET AL., supra note 3, at 7, 
11, 13; Clark & Babson, supra note 5, at 825–28, 834. 
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for nonshareholding constituencies must be “rationally related” to the 
ultimate corporate purpose of maximizing shareholder wealth.102 
Beyond these three judicial precedents, advocates point to the 
academic writings of the Delaware Supreme Court Chief Justice, Leo 
Strine.103 In his extrajudicial capacity, the outspoken chief judicial 
officer of the preeminent corporate law jurisdiction has made explicit 
his belief that conventional corporate law requires directors to 
manage a corporation solely for the benefit of its shareholders.104 
According to Chief Justice Strine, 
Despite attempts to muddy the doctrinal waters, a clear-eyed 
look at the law of corporations in Delaware reveals that, within 
the limits of their discretion, directors must make stockholder 
welfare their sole end, and that other interests may be taken 
into consideration only as a means of promoting stockholder 
welfare.105 
In the same article, the chief justice adds that 
Dodge v. Ford and eBay are hornbook law because they make 
clear that if a fiduciary admits that he is treating an interest 
other than stockholder wealth as an end in itself, rather than an 
instrument to stockholder wealth, he is committing a breach of 
fiduciary duty.106 
Taken together, advocates argue, the extrajudicial 
pronouncements of the Delaware Chief Justice coupled with the 
judicial precedents of Dodge, Revlon, and eBay palpably demonstrate 
that the central mandate of conventional corporate law is that a 
corporation must be managed solely for the benefit of its 
 
 102. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 
1986). 
 103. See Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Dangers of Denial: The Need for a Clear-Eyed 
Understanding of the Power and Accountability Structure Established by the Delaware 
General Corporation Law, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 761, 769–81 (2015) [hereinafter 
Strine, The Dangers of Denial]; Leo E. Strine, Jr., Our Continuing Struggle with the Idea 
That For-Profit Corporations Seek Profit, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 135, 135 (2012) 
[hereinafter Strine, Our Continuing Struggle]. 
 104. See, e.g., Strine, Our Continuing Struggle, supra note 103, at 151 (“[A]s a matter of 
corporate law, the object of the corporation is to produce profits for the stockholders. .	.	. 
[T]he social beliefs of the managers, no more than their own financial interests, cannot be 
their end in managing the corporation.”); id. at 155 (“[C]orporate law requires directors, 
as a matter of their duty of loyalty, to pursue a good faith strategy to maximize profits for 
the stockholders.”). 
 105. See Strine, The Dangers of Denial, supra note 103, at 768. 
 106. Id. at 776–77. 
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shareholders.107 If the directors of a corporation fail to do this, they 
risk shareholder lawsuits and personal liability for breach of fiduciary 
duty.108 It is this central mandate of conventional corporate law that 
advocates argue hinders socially minded entrepreneurs and 
necessitates benefit corporations. 
C. Refuting the Legal Justification for Benefit Corporations 
Despite the assertions advanced by B Lab and others, any casual 
observer might be immediately skeptical that a new statutory business 
form is, in fact, needed to accommodate social enterprises.109 After 
all, even before the existence of benefit corporation statutes, one 
could readily cite examples of prominent for-profit businesses that 
ascribe to and pursue a social mission.110 Consider the familiar buy-
one-give-one businesses TOMS Shoes and Warby Parker.111 The fact 
that these businesses—organized under conventional law—could 
pursue an explicitly prosocial agenda suggests that benefit 
corporations are unnecessary to accomplish this. Indeed, setting aside 
the contested normative question about whether private, for-profit 
corporations have a social responsibility,112 it is plain that as a strictly 
legal matter, conventional corporate law already permits purpose-
 
 107. See, e.g., ALEXANDER, supra note 3, at 26–31; CLARK ET AL., supra note 3, at 7–
14; Clark & Babson, supra note 5, at 825–38. 
 108. See, e.g., CLARK ET AL., supra note 3, at 14 (asserting that “[b]ased on the 
established state legal frameworks, directors [of social enterprises] face legal 
uncertainty”). 
 109. See Joan MacLeod Heminway, Let’s Not Give Up on Traditional For-Profit 
Corporations for Sustainable Social Enterprise, 86 UMKC L. REV. 779, 800–01 (2018) 
[hereinafter Heminway, Let’s Not Give Up] (concluding that “[u]nder existing corporate 
law doctrine, theory, and policy, sustainable social enterprises have been, are being, and 
may be properly and profitably formed, and may continue to exist, as [conventional 
corporations]—even with the relatively new introduction of benefit corporations and other 
social enterprise forms of entity”); Peter Molk, Do We Need Specialized Business Forms 
for Social Enterprise?, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL ENTERPRISE LAW 
241, 244 (Benjamin Means & Joseph W. Yockey eds., 2018) (“[M]any firms that have now 
converted to one of the new social enterprise forms first operated for many years as 
corporations. And they were able to do so because corporate law has long allowed 
corporations the flexibility to consider other constituents beyond investors.”). 
 110. See Tu, supra note 21, at 169–70 (citing several examples of prominent for-profit 
businesses that ascribe to and pursue a social mission); see also Blount & Offei-Danso, 
supra note 43, at 660–62 (citing additional examples). 
 111. See Tu, supra note 21, at 169–70 (discussing TOMS Shoes and Warby Parker); 
Joseph W. Yockey, Does Social Enterprise Law Matter?, 66 ALA. L. REV. 767, 777 (2015) 
(same). It should be noted that TOMS Shoes is in fact organized as an LLC but is 
nonetheless mentioned here as a salient example of a conventionally organized business 
committed to a social mission. 
 112. See Tu, supra note 21, at 127–31 (summarizing the normative debate). 
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driven businesses to advance a social mission alongside or even ahead 
of profits.113 
1.  Shareholder Primacy Is Not Required by Law 
To begin with, state corporation statutes, including Delaware’s, 
allow for the formation of a corporation for “any lawful business.”114 
Thus, rather than dictating the purpose of a corporation to be the 
pursuit of profits for the sole benefit of its shareholders, state statutes 
expressly defer on the question of corporate purpose, allowing for the 
possibility that a corporation might be formed for any sort of purpose, 
including the pursuit of a social mission that might curb or conflict 
with profit seeking.115 Admittedly, as a practical matter, corporations 
must seek profit to survive.116 But corporation statutes do not 
expressly contemplate the pursuit of profits or profit maximization as 
a corporation’s sole or even ultimate purpose. 
The commonly cited cases—Dodge, Revlon, and eBay—do not 
compel a different conclusion.117 Dodge is an archaic decision that 
today has dubious precedential value.118 Moreover, the decision’s 
language regarding shareholder primacy is arguably dicta, and not 
part of the court’s holding.119 Further, Dodge and eBay are more 
appropriately understood as disputes between controlling and 
 
 113. See Judd F. Sneirson, Green is Good: Sustainability, Profitability, and a New 
Paradigm for Corporate Governance, 94 IOWA L. REV. 987, 1007 (2009) (“[C]orporate law 
contains no general requirement that directors and officers maximize shareholder profits 
and only departs from this view in rare instances that should not affect most green 
business decisions.”); see also Blount & Offei-Danso, supra note 43, at 659–60 (arriving at 
the same conclusion); Heminway, Let’s Not Give Up, supra note 109, at 780–87 (same); 
Tu, supra note 21, at 131–41, 169–70 at (same); Winston, supra note 39, at 1813 (same); 
Yockey, supra note 111, at 786–88 (same). 
 114. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §	101(b) (2016) (emphasis added); see also MODEL 
BUS. CORP. ACT §	3.01(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) (“Every corporation incorporated 
under this Act has the purpose of engaging in any lawful business .	.	.	.”). 
 115. See, e.g., Lyman Johnson & David Millon, Corporate Law After Hobby Lobby, 70 
BUS. LAW. 1, 13–14 (2014). 
 116. Id. at 10. 
 117. See Heminway, Shareholder Wealth Maximization, supra note 84, at 955 
(concluding, after an analysis of the relevant case law, that “it would be over-claiming to 
assert that U.S. state decisional law—any more than U.S. state statutory law—articulates a 
clear, legally enforceable shareholder wealth maximization norm as a matter of 
substantive corporate doctrine”); Johnson & Millon, supra note 115, at 10 (“State 
corporate law does not require corporations to prioritize profits over competing 
considerations.”). 
 118. See Lynn A. Stout, Why We Should Stop Teaching Dodge v. Ford, 3 VA. L. & BUS. 
REV. 163, 167 (2008) (questioning the precedential value of Dodge); Winston, supra note 
39, at 1812–13 (same); Yosifon, Law of Corporate Purpose, supra note 2, at 188 (conceding 
Dodge has limited precedential value). 
 119. See Johnson & Millon, supra note 115, at 12; Stout, supra note 118, at 167. 
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minority shareholders, and, therefore, the judicial assertions in both 
decisions as to the ultimate purpose of a corporation must be 
understood in that specific context and not as a broader judicial 
mandate that corporations must always maximize shareholder 
wealth.120 
As to Revlon, that decision applies in only a narrow and specific 
circumstance: where the directors of the corporation have chosen to 
undertake a transaction that will result in a “sale or change of 
control.”121 Directors cannot be forced into a sale, however.122 
Consequently, the applicability of Revlon’s shareholder-wealth-
maximization duty is, in the first instance, optional—a choice that 
must be made by a corporation’s board123—and not an inexorable 
legal mandate.124 Directors may always elect to keep a corporation 
independent to continue to pursue its social mission.125 
 
 120. See Brian Galle, Social Enterprise: Who Needs It?, 54 B.C. L. REV. 2025, 2039–40 
(2013); Johnson & Millon, supra note 115, at 10–13; D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder 
Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. L. 277, 315–20 (1998); Stout, supra note 118, at 167–68; Tu, 
supra note 21, at 135–36; Gordon Smith, eBay v. Newmark: A Modern Version of Dodge 
v. Ford Motor Company, CONGLOMERATE (Sept. 9, 2010), https://web.archive.org/
web/20100912123758/http://www.theconglomerate.org/2010/09/ebay-v-newmark-a-modern-
version-of-dodge-v-ford-motor-company.html [https://perma.cc/YYL3-B9Y6]. 
 121. Although “sale or change of control” transactions are the most common types of 
transactions that trigger Revlon scrutiny, Revlon also applies to two other categories of 
end-stage “break-up” transactions. See Arnold v. Soc’y for Sav. Bancorp, Inc., 650 A.2d 
1270, 1289–90 (Del. 1994) (delineating four specific transactional triggers for Revlon 
scrutiny). 
 122. See Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48, 55 (Del. Ch. 2011) 
(holding that the power to defeat an unwanted acquisition proposal ultimately lies with a 
corporation’s board). 
 123. See Lyondell Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235, 242 (Del. 2009) (holding that 
Revlon applies only when a corporation’s board has elected to pursue a potential sale and 
not when the board simply becomes aware of a prospective acquirer’s interest in a 
potential transaction); Air Prods. & Chems., 16 A.3d at 129 (“[A] board cannot be forced 
into Revlon mode any time a hostile bidder makes a tender offer that is at a premium to 
market value.”). 
 124. See Air Prods. & Chems., 16 A.3d at 112 (“When a company is not in Revlon 
mode, a board of directors ‘is not under any per se duty to maximize shareholder value in 
the short term, even in the context of a takeover.’” (quoting Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. 
Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150 (Del. 1989))). 
 125. As the Delaware Supreme Court has explained, 
The fiduciary duty to manage a corporate enterprise includes the selection of a 
time frame for achievement of corporate goals. That duty may not be delegated to 
the stockholders .	.	.	. Directors are not obliged to abandon a deliberately 
conceived corporate plan for a short-term shareholder profit unless there is clearly 
no basis to sustain the corporate strategy. 
Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1154 (Del. 1989); accord Air 
Prods. & Chems., 16 A.3d at 124 (quoting Paramount, 571 A.2d at 1154). 
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Moreover, even if decisions like Dodge, Revlon, and eBay are 
understood to mean that corporate directors must always prioritize 
shareholders’ interests, that does not mean that directors must be 
solely concerned with profit maximization at the expense of all other 
considerations. That is because prioritizing the shareholders’ interests 
is not per se the same thing as maximizing the corporation’s profits. 
Shareholders of any given corporation will inevitably have interests 
that extend far beyond the profits of that corporation.126 Like all 
humans, shareholders have a range of interests—some financial, some 
nonfinancial, some selfish, and some altruistic—in the broader 
economy, the environment, and their fellow humans.127 These 
interests will, at times, necessarily compete with maximizing the 
corporation’s profits. Therefore, if corporate law commands directors 
to prioritize the interests of shareholders, that command may be 
perfectly compatible with advancing the interests of nonshareholders, 
even where doing so might reduce the shareholders’ financial return. 
Finally, regarding the academic writing of Chief Justice Strine, 
those extrajudicial musings have no legal force, even if the chief 
justice’s personal beliefs are provocative and influential. Indeed, it is 
not a coincidence that the chief justice has left it to academic articles, 
rather than written judicial opinions, to espouse his views on 
shareholder primacy. Because, as discussed next, even if cases like 
Dodge, Revlon, and eBay are interpreted to mean that conventional 
corporate law unequivocally mandates shareholder profit 
maximization, conventional corporate law does not translate that 
mandate into an enforceable legal duty. 
2.  Shareholder Primacy Is Not Enforced by Courts 
Corporation statutes vest a corporation’s board of directors with 
the power and authority to manage the business and affairs of the 
corporation.128 In most cases, the board’s exercise of this statutory 
power is protected from judicial or shareholder second-guessing by 
the judge-made doctrine of the business judgment rule.129 Under the 
 
 126. See LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH 86–89, 96–99 (2012); Paul 
Weitzel & Zachariah J. Rodgers, Broad Shareholder Value and the Inevitable Role of 
Conscience, 12 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 35, 41–42, 49–55 (2015); Winston, supra note 39, at 
1817. 
 127. See STOUT, supra note 126, at 86–89, 96–99; Winston, supra note 39, at 1817–18. 
 128. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §	141(a) (2016); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §	8.01(b) 
(AM. BAR ASS’N 2016). 
 129. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985) (“Under Delaware law, 
the business judgment rule is the offspring of the fundamental principle .	.	. that the 
business and affairs of a Delaware corporation are managed by or under its board of 
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business judgment rule, in the absence of bad faith or a conflict of 
interest, courts will not entertain a shareholder lawsuit challenging a 
board decision that “can be attributed to any rational business 
purpose.”130 
As a consequence of the business judgment rule, in virtually all 
operational decisions, corporate directors are afforded significant 
discretion on how to manage the business and affairs of the 
corporation, without fearing a credible threat of judicial intervention 
or personal liability.131 Applying the business judgment rule, courts 
routinely defer to board decisions that may demonstrably cost the 
corporation in the near term where there is any plausible explanation 
for how that decision will benefit the corporation, and thus its 
shareholders, over the longer term.132 Of course, decisions that 
advance a corporation’s social mission are precisely the type that 
would fall into such a category.133 
 
directors. .	.	. The business judgment rule exists to protect and promote the full and free 
exercise of the managerial power granted to Delaware directors.”); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 
A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (“The business judgment rule is an acknowledgment of the 
managerial prerogatives of Delaware directors under Section 141(a).”). 
 130. See Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971); accord Aronson, 
473 A.2d at 812–13. See generally BAINBRIDGE, supra note 82, at 122–35 (explaining when 
the business judgment rule applies). 
 131. See, e.g., STOUT, supra note 126, at 29–31; Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate 
Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 733, 770–76 (2005). 
 132. See Elhauge, supra note 131, at 772 (“[E]ven if profit-maximization were the 
nominal standard, business judgment review would still sustain any public-spirited activity 
without any inquiry into actual profitability or managers’ actual purposes as long as it has 
some conceivable relationship, however tenuous, to long run profitability.”); Stout, supra 
note 118, at 170–71 (observing that, under the business judgment rule, “courts regularly 
allow corporate directors to make business decisions that harm shareholders in order to 
benefit other corporate constituencies .	.	. so long as any plausible connection can be made 
between the directors’ decision and some possible future benefit, however intangible and 
unlikely, to shareholders”); Strine, Our Continuing Struggle, supra note 103, at 147 n.34 
(“It is, of course, accepted that a corporation may take steps, such as giving charitable 
contributions or paying higher wages, that do not maximize corporate profits currently. 
They may do so, however, because such activities are rationalized as producing greater 
profits over the long-term.”); Tu, supra note 21, at 140 (“[T]he discretion granted under 
the business judgment rule effectively eviscerates the claim that corporation managers 
must be driven by the sole goal of shareholder profit maximization.”); Yockey, supra note 
111, at 787 (noting that because of the business judgment rule “no modern court has 
overturned an ordinary business decision on the basis that it impermissibly put social goals 
ahead of shareholder profits”). 
 133. See eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 33 (Del. Ch. 2010) 
(“When director decisions are reviewed under the business judgment rule, this Court will 
not question rational judgments about how promoting non-stockholder interests—be it 
through making a charitable contribution, paying employees higher salaries and benefits, 
or more general norms like promoting a particular corporate culture—ultimately promote 
stockholder value.”); Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of 
Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 303 (1999) (“[C]ase law interpreting the business 
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To take one example, consider the decision of the 
pharmaceutical retailer CVS Caremark in 2014 to stop selling tobacco 
products in its stores134—a decision that predictably caused an 
immediate drop in CVS’s retail sales.135 The company’s CEO justified 
the decision, in part, by invoking CVS’s decidedly prosocial corporate 
mission: for a business “dedicated to helping people on their path to 
better health,” the CEO explained, “the sale of tobacco products is 
inconsistent with our purpose” as a company.136 But the CEO also 
justified the decision, in part, by invoking the potential for long-term 
financial returns: “[R]emoving tobacco products from our retail 
shelves further distinguishes us in how we are serving our patients, 
clients and health care providers and better positions us for continued 
growth in the evolving health care marketplace.”137 
No one doubts that corporate actions like CVS’s decision to 
cease tobacco sales would be protected from judicial scrutiny by the 
business judgment rule.138 Consequently, even those who insist that 
corporate law mandates shareholder wealth maximization concede 
that the business judgment rule makes it virtually impossible to 
enforce that mandate in court.139 Instead, they argue that the ability of 
 
judgment rule often explicitly authorizes directors to sacrifice shareholders’ interests to 
protect other constituencies.”); Elhauge, supra note 131, at 772 (“[I]t is hard to see what 
socially responsible conduct could not plausibly be justified under the commonly accepted 
rationalizations that it helps forestall possible adverse reactions from consumers, 
employees, the neighborhood, other businesses, or government regulators .	.	.	.”); Johnson 
& Millon, supra note 115, at 11 (“[B]usiness corporations pursuing social missions at the 
expense of shareholder value are [likely] to justify such policies with reference to long-run 
shareholder financial interests .	.	.	.”). 
 134. CVS Caremark, CVS Caremark to Stop Selling Tobacco at All CVS/Pharmacy 
Locations, PR NEWSWIRE (Feb. 5, 2014), https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/cvs-
caremark-to-stop-selling-tobacco-at-all-cvspharmacy-locations-243662651.html [https://perma.cc/
JJQ4-SRKD]. 
 135. Matt Egan, CVS Banned Tobacco. Now Its Sales Are Hurting, CNN BUS. (Aug. 4, 
2015), https://money.cnn.com/2015/08/04/investing/cvs-earnings-cigarettes/ [https://perma.cc/
Y5WP-2WX8]. 
 136. CVS Caremark, supra note 134. 
 137. Id. (emphasis added). 
 138. See Joshua P. Fershee, The End of Responsible Growth and Governance?: The 
Risks Posed by Social Enterprise Enabling Statutes and the Demise of Director Primacy, 19 
TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 361, 376–81 (2017) (arguing that CVS should be entitled 
to the deference of the business judgment rule even in the absence of any explanation as 
to its potential for realizing value in the long term). 
 139. See, e.g., BAINBRIDGE, supra note 82, at 248 (“The court may hold forth on the 
primacy of shareholder interests, .	.	. [but] directors who consider nonshareholder interests 
in making corporate decisions .	.	. will be insulated from liability by the business judgment 
rule.”); Strine, The Dangers of Denial, supra note 103, at 776 (“[T]he business judgment 
rule provides directors with wide discretion, and thus enables directors to justify—by 
reference to long-run stockholder interests—a number of decisions that may in fact be 
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directors to tacitly eschew shareholder primacy and advance 
nonshareholder concerns is an “unintended consequence of the 
business judgment rule.”140 But from a pragmatic perspective, there is 
little difference between a legal regime that openly rejects 
shareholder primacy and one that simply declines to enforce it.141 
Nevertheless, one might point to cases like Dodge and eBay to 
argue that, despite the protections of the business judgment rule, 
courts do, in fact, sometimes enforce shareholder primacy.142 Indeed, 
these cases do suggest an outer limit to the business judgment rule: 
when directors openly renounce shareholder interests in favor of any 
nonshareholding constituencies, they lose the presumption of good 
faith and, therefore, the protection of the business judgment rule.143 
But few, if any, business leaders would ever renounce their 
shareholders’ interests because few, if any, actually believe that 
socially and environmentally conscious pursuits are zero-sum 
propositions that must come at the expense of shareholder returns.144 
Instead, social entrepreneurs tend to believe that a prosocial mission 
and for-profit activities create synergy—that socially and 
environmentally responsible policies boost shareholders’ returns in 
the long run.145 That is, after all, the social enterprise business 
 
motivated more by a concern for a charity the CEO cares about, the community in which 
the corporate headquarters is located, or once in a while, even the company’s ordinary 
workers, rather than long-run stockholder wealth.”); Yosifon, Law of Corporate Purpose, 
supra note 2, at 223 (conceding that the business judgment rule gives directors “near total 
discretion” and, therefore, “it is nearly impossible to enforce the shareholder primacy 
norm”). But see CLARK ET AL., supra note 3, at 12 (asserting that even in cases where the 
business judgment rule applies, “resolution of litigation by a shareholder seeking 
maximized financial return against the directors .	.	. would be uncertain at best”). 
 140. See Yosifon, Law of Corporate Purpose, supra note 2, at 222–26; Stephen 
Bainbridge, The Relationship Between the Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm and the 




 141. Arguably, this assertion conflates a standard of conduct (shareholder wealth 
maximization) with a standard of review (business judgment rule). See ALEXANDER, 
supra note 3, at 38–39. But from a pragmatic perspective, the standard of review is far 
more relevant to a director than a precatory, judicially unenforced standard of conduct. 
 142. See Murray, Choose Your Own Master, supra note 2, at 12; Yosifon, Law of 
Corporate Purpose, supra note 2, at 225. 
 143. See Strine, Our Continuing Struggle, supra note 103, at 147–48. 
 144. More cynically, one could argue that the reason socially minded business leaders 
seldom openly renounce shareholder interests is that “[a]fter Dodge v. Ford, most .	.	. have 
realized they need to tie altruistic motivations back to long-term shareholder value.” 
Murray, Choose Your Own Master, supra note 2, at 13. 
 145. See, e.g., YVON CHOUINARD, LET MY PEOPLE GO SURFING: THE EDUCATION 
OF A RELUCTANT BUSINESSMAN 3 (2006) (“[B]usiness can produce food, cure disease, 
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model.146 Thus, even if one reads Dodge and eBay to place an outer 
limit on the protections of the business judgment rule, that limit is 
trivial for directors bent on pursuing social or environmental goals. 
Although the business judgment rule affords directors significant 
discretion to advance nonshareholder interests, some have expressed 
concern that in circumstances where the courts have held the business 
judgment rule is inapplicable—especially upon the sale of the 
company—directors are legally obligated to focus solely on 
shareholder wealth.147 After all, as already noted, Revlon holds 
unequivocally that where a board of directors seeks to sell a 
corporation, “concern for non-stockholder interests is 
inappropriate.”148 Instead, “[t]he duty of the board [is] the 
maximization of the company’s value at a sale for the stockholders’ 
benefit.”149 
But even this seemingly unequivocal duty is largely 
unenforceable.150 To begin with, as already noted, a corporation’s 
board cannot be forced into a sale and, therefore, is not inexorably 
subject to the Revlon duty to maximize shareholder wealth.151 Even 
when directors do elect to pursue a sale and, consequently, become 
 
control population, employ people, and generally enrich our lives. And it can do these 
good things and make a profit, without losing its soul.”); Hamermesh et al., supra note 23, 
at 323 (“[O]ver the course of the 11 years [in business], over and over again, our 
commitment to social responsibility proved to be not only the right thing to do but also 
good business. We saw that show up in employee retention, relationships with our 
suppliers, [and] relationships with our retailers .	.	.	.” (quoting a founder of B Lab)). 
 146. See generally Janet E. Kerr, Sustainability Meets Profitability: The Convenient 
Truth of How the Business Judgment Rule Protects a Board’s Decision to Engage in Social 
Entrepreneurship, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 623 (2007) (making the business case that socially 
and environmentally responsible policies can enhance shareholder value); Michael E. 
Porter & Mark R. Kramer, Creating Shared Value: How to Reinvent Capitalism––and 
Unleash a Wave of Innovation and Growth, HARV. BUS. REV., Jan.–Feb. 2011, at 2 (same). 
 147. See, e.g., CLARK ET AL., supra note 3, at 13. Aside from the sale context, 
corporate boards do not enjoy the deference of the business judgment rule when 
undertaking defensive measures in the face of a hostile takeover bid. See Unitrin, Inc. v. 
Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1372–74 (Del. 1995). However, in the hostile takeover 
context, relevant law already expressly enables boards to consider the interest of 
nonshareholding constituencies. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 
955 (Del. 1985). Moreover, courts afford boards significant discretion in resisting an 
unwanted acquisition proposal. See supra note 121–25 and accompanying text. 
 148. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 
1986) (emphasis added). 
 149. Id. 
 150. See Lyman Johnson & Robert Ricca, The Dwindling of Revlon, 71 WASH. & LEE 
L. REV. 167, 217 (2014) (suggesting that Revlon is no longer “a legally enforceable 
directive” but instead “a customarily adhered to but ultimately nonenforceable norm or 
mere aspirational standard”). 
 151. See supra notes 121–25 and accompanying text. 
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subject to Revlon, courts afford directors significant latitude in 
determining the process and ultimate terms of the sale.152 Courts often 
repeat the mantra that “there is no single blueprint that a board must 
follow to fulfill its [Revlon] duties.”153 In practice, this mantra means 
that, in the absence of a conflict of interest, courts will require an 
“extreme set of facts” to hold directors monetarily liable under 
Revlon for breach of fiduciary duty.154 More significantly, the 
requirements of Revlon are inoperative where the sale of a 
corporation has been approved by a majority vote of the 
corporation’s shareholders155—even if it can be shown that the sale 
failed to maximize shareholder wealth. The upshot is that courts will 
almost never hold directors liable for damages under Revlon156 and 
have little reason to even enjoin a proposed sale pending a 
shareholder vote based solely on the premise that the directors have 
failed to maximize shareholder value.157 
 
 152. See, e.g., C & J Energy Servs., Inc. v. City of Miami Gen. Emps.’ & Sanitation 
Emps.’ Ret. Tr., 107 A.3d 1049, 1053 (Del. 2014) (“Revlon and its progeny do not set out a 
specific route that a board must follow .	.	.	, and an independent board is entitled to use its 
business judgment to decide to enter into a strategic transaction that promises great 
benefit, even when it creates certain risks.”); id. at 1067 (“Revlon does not require a board 
to set aside its own view of what is best for the corporation’s stockholders and run an 
auction whenever the board approves a change of control transaction.”); Lyondell Chem. 
Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235, 242–43 (Del. 2009) (“No court can tell directors exactly how to 
accomplish th[e] goal [of maximizing shareholder value] .	.	.	. [T]here are no legally 
prescribed steps that directors must follow to satisfy their Revlon duties.”). 
 153. See, e.g., C & J Energy Servs., 107 A.3d at 1067 (quoting Barkan v. Amsted Indus., 
Inc., 567 A.2d 1279, 1286 (Del. 1989)). 
 154. See Lyondell Chem., 970 A.2d at 243 (quoting In re Lear Corp. S’holder Litig., 967 
A.2d 640, 654 (Del. Ch. 2008)). 
 155. See Corwin v. KKR Fin. Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304, 308–09 (Del. 2015) (holding 
that the business judgment rule, rather than Revlon, applies where a transaction has been 
approved by an “uncoerced, informed stockholder vote”). 
 156. See id. at 312 (noting that Revlon is “not [a] tool[] designed with post-closing 
money damages claims in mind”); Matthew D. Cain et al., The Shifting Tides of Merger 
Litigation, 71 VAND. L. REV. 603, 606 (2018) (noting that “deferential standards of judicial 
review” in cases like Corwin has “[t]he net effect of .	.	. limit[ing] substantially the 
availability of a post-closing suit for damages”); James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, 
Delaware’s Retreat: Exploring Developing Fissures and Tectonic Shifts in Delaware 
Corporate Law, 42 DEL. J. CORP. L. 323, 337 (2018) (observing that Corwin “appears to 
confine Revlon duties to equitable relief, except where there is egregious misconduct”). 
 157. See, e.g., Corwin, 125 A.3d at 312–13 (“[T]he long-standing policy of our law has 
been to avoid the uncertainties and costs of judicial second-guessing when the 
disinterested stockholders have had the free and informed chance to decide on the 
economic merits of a transaction for themselves.”); C & J Energy Servs., 107 A.3d at 1068, 
1070–71 (explaining that an injunction based on Revlon is inappropriate where 
shareholders will have the opportunity to vote on the pending transaction at issue); 
Johnson & Ricca, supra note 150, at 211–15 (“In recent years, the chancery court 
consistently has refused to grant injunctive relief on Revlon claims in the pre-closing 
context.”). 
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So, in summary, although courts might sometimes use the 
rhetoric of shareholder primacy, that rhetoric does not, absent 
unusual or extraordinary facts, translate into an enforceable legal 
duty. But even if conventional corporate law did mandate and enforce 
shareholder wealth maximization as a legal duty of a corporation’s 
board, as described next, that duty is at most a default rule. It is not 
mandatory—not under Delaware law at least. Consequently, social 
enterprises seeking to advance a social mission alongside profits are 
already able to opt out of any perceived legal strictures imposed by 
shareholder primacy. 
3.  Shareholder Primacy Is Subject to Private Ordering 
Delaware’s general corporation statute, like the conventional 
corporation statutes of other jurisdictions, is broadly enabling, 
providing mostly default rules of corporate governance and 
permitting entrepreneurs and investors significant freedom to tailor 
those rules through the terms of a corporation’s governing 
documents.158 As already noted, the Delaware statute expressly 
authorizes a corporation to be organized for “any lawful business” 
specified in the corporation’s certificate of incorporation.159 The 
statute further provides that a corporation’s certificate may include 
“[a]ny provision for the management of the business and for the 
conduct of the affairs of the corporation .	.	. if such provisions are not 
contrary to the laws of this State.”160 Pursuant to these statutory 
provisions, a purpose-driven business may stipulate in its corporate 
charter a social mission and elevate that mission on par with or above 
profit seeking.161 Put differently, even if decisions like Dodge, Revlon, 
and eBay are interpreted to impose a mandate of shareholder 
 
 158. See Edward P. Welch & Robert S. Saunders, Freedom and Its Limits in the 
Delaware General Corporation Law, 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 845, 847–55 (2008). 
 159. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §	101(b) (2016). 
 160. See id. 
 161. See, e.g., Blount & Offei-Danso, supra note 43, at 663 (“Placing a social mission in 
a corporation’s articles of incorporation or bylaws to alert possible shareholders of the 
specific obligation the corporation has undertaken to society is permissible and would not 
offend corporate laws.”); Molk, supra note 109, at 245 (“[C]orporations can always amend 
their charter to authorize management to include impact on non-shareholder interests in 
their decision making.”); Reiser, supra note 43, at 608 (“At inception, it appears 
permissible to include charitable or social goals as part of a corporation’s purposes.”); Tu, 
supra note 21, at 168 (“A traditional for-profit corporation could organize for the express 
purpose of pursuing a specified purpose such as the pursuit or creation of a public 
benefit.”). 
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primacy, that mandate is merely a default rule that may be altered by 
private ordering through the terms of a corporation’s charter.162 
Some advocates of benefit corporation legislation have 
questioned this conclusion,163 pointing out that any private ordering in 
a Delaware corporation’s certificate of incorporation is limited by the 
statutory proviso that such private ordering cannot be “contrary to the 
laws of this State.”164 The concern is that because shareholder primacy 
is, in their view, enshrined in Delaware common law, any provisions 
found in a corporation’s charter that purport to opt out of 
shareholder primacy are “contrary to the laws” of Delaware.165 
To be sure, the limitation on private ordering—that a charter 
provision may not be “contrary to the laws” of Delaware—
encompasses not just the state’s statutory law but also its common 
law.166 Yet, as already noted, nothing in Delaware’s statutory law 
mandates shareholder primacy.167 And to the extent Delaware 
common law does establish a rule that a conventional corporation 
must be run solely for the benefit of its shareholders, the common law 
“neither states nor implies any public policy indicating that [such a] 
rule should be unalterable by charter provision.”168 Stated differently, 
 
 162. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, A Close Read of an Excellent Commentary on 
Dodge v. Ford, 3 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 177, 179 (2008) (arguing, from a contractarian 
perspective, that the shareholder wealth maximization norm is merely a default rule of 
corporate law that may be altered by private ordering); see also Stephen M. Bainbridge, 
Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 
577–83 (2003) (same). 
 163. See, e.g., ALEXANDER, supra note 3, at 150–51; CLARK ET AL., supra note 3, at 13. 
 164. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §	102(b)(1) (2016) (emphasis added). 
 165. See ALEXANDER, supra note 3, at 150–51; CLARK ET AL., supra note 3, at 13; see 
also Stephen M. Bainbridge, Interpreting Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes, 19 PEPP. 
L. REV. 971, 985 (1992) (“[S]tate law arguably does not permit corporate organic 
documents to redefine the directors’ fiduciary duties. In general, a charter amendment 
may not derogate from common law rules if doing so conflicts with some settled public 
policy. In light of the well-settled shareholder wealth maximization policy, nonmonetary 
factors charter amendments therefore appear vulnerable.” (footnote omitted)). 
 166. See David G. Yosifon, Opting Out of Shareholder Primacy: Is the Public Benefit 
Corporation Trivial?, 41 DEL. J. CORP. L. 461, 477–80 (2017) [hereinafter Yosifon, Opting 
Out of Shareholder Primacy] (analyzing relevant Delaware precedents). 
 167. See supra text accompanying note 84. 
 168. Yosifon, Opting Out of Shareholder Primacy, supra note 166, at 479 (citing 
Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1985)); cf. 
Heminway, Shareholder Wealth Maximization, supra note 84, at 958–66 (arguing that 
Yosifon’s assessment on the validity of private ordering “merits credit” even though “[t]he 
accumulated evidence is at best unclear about whether a [corporation] .	.	. can engage in 
private ordering” to opt out of shareholder primacy); Strine, The Dangers of Denial, supra 
note 103, at 782–83 (“It may well be the case that a certificate of incorporation that said 
that a for-profit corporation would put other constituencies’ interests on par with 
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nothing in the common law indicates that shareholder primacy is a 
mandatory and unwaivable rule for Delaware corporations. A 
contrary reading of Delaware common law—as mandating an 
unwaivable requirement of shareholder primacy—would be plainly 
inconsistent with widely accepted characterization of Delaware 
general corporation law among academics,169 practitioners,170 and the 
state’s courts171 as broadly “enabling” and committed to “private 
ordering.”172 Such a reading would also arguably conflict with the 
express terms of Delaware’s corporation statute, which contemplates 
 
stockholders would, in view of §	101(b), be respected and supersede the corporate 
common law.”). 
 169. See Jill E. Fisch, Governance by Contract: The Implications for Corporate Bylaws, 
106 CALIF. L. REV. 373, 379 (2018) (“By virtue of its largely enabling structure, Delaware 
corporate law is consistent with the private ordering approach.”); Lawrence A. 
Hamermesh, The Policy Foundations of Delaware Corporate Law, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 
1749, 1783 (2006) (“There has been a strong tendency in Delaware corporate 
policymaking to broaden that room for private ordering.”). 
 170. See, e.g., Welch & Saunders, supra note 158, at 847 (“The [Delaware corporation 
statute] gives incorporators enormous freedom to adopt the terms they believe are most 
appropriate for the organization, finance, and governance of their particular enterprise.”); 
see also E. Norman Veasey & Christine T. Di Guglielmo, History Informs American 
Corporate Law: The Necessity of Maintaining A Delicate Balance in the Federal 
“Ecosystem”, 1 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 201, 204 (2006) (“Corporate statutes, like the 
Delaware General Corporation Law, continue to take an enabling approach and allow 
wide latitude for private ordering.”). 
 171. See, e.g., Shintom Co. v. Audiovox Corp., 888 A.2d 225, 227 (Del. 2005) 
(describing Delaware’s corporation statute as “an enabling statute that provides great 
flexibility for creating the capital structure of a Delaware corporation”); Jones Apparel 
Grp., Inc. v. Maxwell Shoe Co., 883 A.2d 837, 845 (Del. Ch. 2004) (Strine, V.C.) (noting 
that Delaware corporate law “is widely regarded as the most flexible in the nation because 
it leaves the parties to the corporate contract (managers and stockholders) with great 
leeway to structure their relations, subject to relatively loose statutory constraints”); id. 
(“Sections 102(b)(1) and 141(a) are therefore logically read as important provisions that 
embody Delaware’s commitment to private ordering in the charter. By their plain terms, 
they are sections of broad effect, which apply to a myriad of issues involving the exercise 
of corporate power.”); Hollinger Int’l, Inc. v. Black, 844 A.2d 1022, 1078 (Del. Ch. 2004) 
(Strine, V.C.) (“[Delaware’s corporation statute] is intentionally designed to provide 
directors and stockholders with flexible authority, permitting great discretion for private 
ordering and adaptation.”); In re Appraisal of Ford Holdings., Inc. Preferred Stock, 698 
A.2d 973, 976 (Del. Ch. 1997) (Allen, C.) (explaining that “unlike the corporation law of 
the nineteenth century, modern corporation law contains few mandatory terms; it is 
largely enabling in character”). 
 172. Leo E. Strine, Jr., Delaware’s Corporate-Law System: Is Corporate America 
Buying an Exquisite Jewel or a Diamond in the Rough? A Response to Kahan & Kamar’s 
Price Discrimination in the Market for Corporate Law, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1257, 1260 
(2001) (describing Delaware’s approach to corporate law as one that is “largely enabling 
and provides a wide realm for private ordering”); see also E. Norman Veasey, An 
Economic Rationale for Judicial Decisionmaking in Corporate Law, 53 BUS. L. 681, 686 
(1998) (“The Delaware General Corporation Law is an enabling act that provides wide 
discretion to fine-tune intra-corporate arrangements.”). 
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the primacy of a corporation’s charter in matters central to the 
governance and management of the business.173 
Thus, to summarize, a purpose-driven business organized under 
Delaware’s conventional corporation statute is already authorized to 
include in its corporate charter provisions that opt out of shareholder 
primacy and instead commit the business to a social mission alongside 
or even ahead of profit seeking. Benefit corporation legislation is not 
and was never necessary to accomplish this. Of course, the same 
analysis could also be applied to the corporation statutes of other 
states.174 More importantly, however, as described below, most states 
outside of Delaware have affirmatively rejected shareholder primacy 
through the adoption of constituency statutes. 
4.  States Outside of Delaware Expressly Reject Shareholder Primacy 
Even if shareholder primacy is an enforceable and unwaivable 
legal rule under the conventional corporate law of Delaware, 
Delaware is only one state. A business may incorporate under the 
laws of any state, regardless of where the business actually operates.175 
Under the internal affairs doctrine, the internal affairs of a 
corporation—including the fiduciary duties of directors as well as the 
permissible lawful purpose of the corporation—are governed by the 
state of incorporation.176 
Although most large corporations choose to organize under 
Delaware law, all businesses have the option to incorporate 
elsewhere. Outside of Delaware, thirty-two states have adopted so-
called constituency statutes.177 These statutes explicitly authorize the 
directors of a corporation to consider a broad range of factors 
 
 173. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §	141(a) (2016) (“The business and affairs of 
every corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction 
of a board of directors, except as may be otherwise provided .	.	. in its certificate of 
incorporation.” (emphasis added)). 
 174. See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §	2.02(b)(2) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) 
(authorizing a corporation’s charter to include provisions regarding “(i) the purpose or 
purposes for which the corporation is organized; (ii) managing the business and regulating 
the affairs of the corporation; [and] (iii) defining, limiting, and regulating the powers of 
the corporation, its board of directors, and shareholders”). 
 175. See Kent Greenfield, Democracy and Dominance of Delaware in Corporate Law, 
67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 135, 135–39 (2004). 
 176. See McDermott Inc. v. Lewis, 531 A.2d 206, 214 (Del. 1987) (explaining the 
internal affairs doctrine); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §	302 (AM. 
LAW INST. 1971). 
 177. See Anthony Bisconti, Note, The Double Bottom Line: Can Constituency Statutes 
Protect Socially Responsible Corporations Stuck in Revlon Land?, 42 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 
765, 768 n.13 (2009). 
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affecting nonshareholding constituencies when discharging their 
statutory duty to manage the corporation.178 Some states’ constituency 
statutes limit a board’s authority to consider nonshareholder concerns 
to situations involving the sale or takeover of the corporation.179 
Other states’ constituency statutes are broader, allowing a board to 
consider the impact on nonshareholding constituencies in all matters 
brought before the board.180 In either case, states that have adopted 
constituency statutes have affirmatively rejected the notion that a 
corporate board of directors must consider and pursue shareholder 
interests only.181 Instead, such statutes expressly contemplate that, in 
appropriate circumstances, corporate directors may account for 
various nonshareholding constituencies.182 
The existence of constituency statutes coupled with the internal 
affairs doctrine means socially minded businesses are not inexorably 
bound to shareholder primacy under Delaware law or the 
conventional corporate law of any other state that is perceived to 
mandate it.183 Rather, to the extent that the state of incorporation is a 
choice, so too are any supposed legal strictures imposed by 
shareholder primacy.184 
Some advocates of benefit corporation legislation have criticized 
state constituency statutes on the grounds that such statutes only 
authorize corporate directors to consider the impact of their decisions 
on nonshareholding constituencies, but do not compel directors to 
actually do so.185 Put differently, constituency statutes permit, but do 
not mandate, a prosocial, multistakeholder approach to corporate 
 
 178. See, e.g., id. at 782–83. 
 179. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §	60.357(5) (Westlaw through 2018 Reg. Sess. & 
Spec. Sess.). 
 180. See, e.g., N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW §	717(b) (McKinney Supp. 2019); 15 PA. CONS. 
STAT. ANN. §	516(a) (Westlaw through 2018 Reg. Sess. Act 164). 
 181. See Johnson & Millon, supra note 115, at 14 (“Either expressly or by clear 
implication, they reject the shareholder wealth maximization conception of management 
responsibility, conferring broad discretion to sacrifice profits for alternative objectives.”). 
 182. See, e.g., CLARK ET AL., supra note 3, at 9; Tu, supra note 21, at 137–38. 
 183. See Murray, Choose Your Own Master, supra note 2, at 19–20 (“[S]ome state 
[business corporation] statutes [citing the example of Oregon] already explicitly allow a 
social or environmental focus. Social entrepreneurs seeking to use the corporate form 
could simply incorporate in one of those states .	.	.	.”). 
 184. See Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial?: A Political and Economic 
Analysis, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 542, 556–58 (1990) (explaining how the “relatively low cost 
strategy of re-incorporating” enables a corporation “to avoid [corporate law] rules that are 
mandatory in state A, but optional in state B”). 
 185. See, e.g., ALEXANDER, supra note 3, at 136–37; CLARK ET AL., supra note 3, at 
10–11. 
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governance.186 Of course, nothing in benefit corporation statutes 
ensures that directors will actually consider the interests of any 
nonshareholding constituency either.187 But putting that significant 
shortcoming aside momentarily, some states’ conventional 
corporation laws do, in fact, permit a corporation to make prosocial, 
multistakeholder governance mandatory188—or at least as mandatory 
as made by benefit corporation statutes. 
Consider Oregon’s conventional corporation statute. Oregon’s 
statute includes a typical constituency provision,189 but it also includes 
a separate provision permitting a corporation’s charter to include 
terms “authorizing or directing the corporation to conduct the 
business of the corporation in a manner that is environmentally and 
socially responsible.”190 By expressly permitting a corporate charter to 
not only “authorize” but also “direct” the corporation to conduct its 
business in a manner that is environmentally and socially responsible, 
Oregon’s conventional corporation statute already enables a 
corporation, through private ordering, to adopt the basic governance 
framework of a benefit corporation.191 Thus, if the justification for 
benefit corporation legislation is to enable socially minded businesses 
to opt into a mandatory system of prosocial, multistakeholder 
governance, that too is already available through the conventional 
corporate form without the need for a separate benefit corporation 
statute.192 
 
 186. See MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. §	301 cmt. (2017), https://benefitcorp.net/sites/
default/files/Model%20benefit%20corp%20legislation%20_4_17_17.pdf [https://perma.cc/
W55T-SPDS] (“In a state that has adopted a ‘constituency statute,’ directors are 
authorized to consider the interests of corporate constituencies other than the 
shareholders, but the directors are not required to do so.”). 
 187. See infra Section III.A. 
 188. For example, Pennsylvania’s corporation statute allows companies to adopt by 
charter any corporate governance provision whatsoever. Black, supra note 184, at 555. 
Applying Pennsylvania law, the United States Supreme Court concluded that a for-profit 
corporation may pursue its owner’s religious objectives, even if doing so may limit profits. 
See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2770–71 (2014). 
 189. See OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §	60.357(1) (Westlaw through 2018 Reg. Sess. & Spec. 
Sess.). 
 190. Id. §	60.047(2)(e) (emphasis added); see also Jason C. Jones, The Oregon Trail: A 
New Path to Environmentally Responsible Corporate Governance?, 54 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 
335, 347–50 (2009). 
 191. See Murray, Choose Your Own Master, supra note 2, at 25 n.110 (noting “Oregon 
[corporation law] has already made .	.	. explicit in its corporate statute” the ability to opt 
out of shareholder primacy); Sneirson, supra note 113, at 1020 (“The ‘directing’ language 
literally mandates that the firm be run in an environmentally and socially responsible 
manner, like the B Corporation .	.	.	.”). 
 192. See Murray, Beneficial Benefit LLCs?, supra note 7, at 442 (“[T]he legal 
justification for .	.	. benefit corporation law [is] weak in states like Oregon that already 
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5.  Shareholder Primacy Is a Norm and Not a Legal Mandate 
Given the foregoing, many scholars have questioned the purpose 
of or need for benefit corporation statutes.193 Conventional corporate 
law already enables the directors of a socially minded business to 
promote the interests of nonshareholding constituencies and advance 
public benefit. To the extent that the real-world behavior of directors 
appears fixated instead on shareholder-wealth maximization, and not 
advancing the interest of nonshareholders, nothing in conventional 
corporate law compels this behavior. Instead, adherence to a principle 
of shareholder primacy reflects a widely embraced, extralegal norm, 
rather than an enforceable legal obligation.194 
Admittedly, conventional corporate law does facilitate this norm 
but not through any artificial restrictions on corporate purpose or 
through directors’ fiduciary duties. Rather, it does so by affording 
shareholders a privileged position within the corporate form.195 Only 
 
allowed social and environmental purposes for its traditional corporations; technically 
social entrepreneurs should have been able to achieve their legal goals with a traditional 
Oregon corporation.”). 
 193. See, e.g., Murray, Choose Your Own Master, supra note 2, at 16 (“[C]ertain social 
enterprise proponents may have overstated the need for benefit corporation statutes, as 
existing corporate law—whether through the business judgment rule, constituency 
statutes, or express provisions in the corporate law of states outside of Delaware––already 
provides significant protection to directors who choose to favor or consider non-
shareholder stakeholders in their decisions.”); Tu, supra note 21, at 167 (“[T]he addition 
of Benefit Corporations creates an overlap with traditional for-profit corporations where 
both are capable of pursuing dual objectives of profit and public benefit.”); Joan 
Heminway, Benefit Corporations: What Am I Missing—Seriously?, BUS. L. PROF BLOG 
(Feb. 23, 2015), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/business_law/2015/02/benefit-corporations-
what-am-i-missing-seriously.html [http://perma.cc/28XB-NTPU] [hereinafter Heminway, 
What Am I Missing] (“Social enterprise businesses form all the time as for-profit or non-
profit business associations. The lack of a benefit corporation statute has not impeded 
social enterprise .	.	. and there is no proof a new statutory regime would encourage the 
formation of desirable social enterprises.”). 
 194. See Heminway, Shareholder Wealth Maximization, supra note 84, at 950 
(acknowledging that a norm of shareholder wealth maximization may exist “even if the 
evidence may not permit a form conclusion that the norm has been codified as legal 
doctrine”); Johnson & Millon, supra note 115, at 11 (“The profit maximization norm .	.	. is, 
descriptively, a product of deep-seated business lore and practices, market pressures, and 
professional education, not law.”); Murray, Choose Your Own Master, supra note 2, at 17–
18 (observing that the “persistent common perception .	.	. that directorial duties require 
placing shareholder wealth at the forefront .	.	. has arguably risen to the level of a widely 
recognized and influential norm”); Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Islands of 
Conscious Power: Law, Norms, and the Self-Governing Corporation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 
1619, 1643–44 (2001) (describing shareholder wealth maximization as a nonlegal norm); 
Sneirson, supra note 113, at 1011 (“Perhaps more than the law or the market, norms instill 
in corporate fiduciaries a drive to maximize shareholder profit.”). 
 195. See Strine, The Dangers of Denial, supra note 103, at 766, 784; see also Blair & 
Stout, supra note 133, at 288. 
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the shareholders of a corporation—and not any other corporate 
constituency—are enfranchised to elect the corporation’s board.196 
Consequently, “directors cannot subordinate the .	.	. interests of 
[shareholders] to that of other corporate constituencies unless the 
[shareholders] themselves support that subordination.”197 If the 
shareholders, instead, prefer to maximize corporate profits, then 
directors will do so, not because corporate law requires them to do so 
but because directors owe their continued employment as directors to 
the shareholders who elect them.198 In this respect, to quote Chief 
Justice Strine, “the power dynamics created by corporate law itself 
dictate the ends of corporate governance.”199 
Ironically, benefit corporation statutes do nothing to change 
these “power dynamics.”200 Shareholders of a benefit corporation 
enjoy the same privileged status as shareholders of a conventional 
corporation, being the sole constituency empowered to elect the 
corporation’s board.201 Rather than alter the franchise enjoyed 
exclusively by shareholders, benefit corporation statutes tinker with 
corporate purpose and directors’ duties.202 But, as demonstrated 
 
 196. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §	211(b) (2016). 
 197. Leo E. Strine, Jr., Corporate Power Is Corporate Purpose I: Evidence from My 
Hometown, 33 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 176, 179 (2017) [hereinafter Strine, Corporate 
Power Is Corporate Purpose I]. 
 198. See id.; accord Mohsen Manesh, Nearing 30, Is Revlon Showing Its Age?, 71 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 107, 144 (2014) [hereinafter Manesh, Nearing 30] (“If 
directors myopically focus on the interests of shareholders, then it is not because corporate 
law requires it, but because shareholders demand it.”); Rock & Wachter, supra note 194, 
at 1644 (identifying “the fact that .	.	. only shareholders get to vote” as a source of the 
shareholder primacy norm). 
 199. Leo E. Strine, Jr., Corporate Power Is Corporate Purpose II: An Encouragement 
for Future Consideration from Professors Johnson and Millon, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
1165, 1174 (2017) [hereinafter Strine, Corporate Power Is Corporate Purpose II]. 
 200. See ALEXANDER, supra note 3, at 94–95 (acknowledging that “a central 
theoretical underpinning of the benefit corporation [is that] shareholders have an interest 
in promoting the interest of all stakeholders and are adequate representatives for them”); 
Clark & Babson, supra note 5, at 850 (conceding that “the main policing mechanism for 
the performance of directors is the right of the shareholders to elect the directors”). 
 201. See MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. §	101(c) (2017), https://benefitcorp.net/sites/
default/files/Model%20benefit%20corp%20legislation%20_4_17_17.pdf [https://perma.cc/
W55T-SPDS]. 
 202. The MBCL does contemplate that a benefit corporation may elect to have an 
independent “benefit director,” charged with evaluating whether the business fulfilled its 
statutory obligations under the MBCL to create public benefit and consider the interests 
of nonshareholding constituencies. Id. §	302. Earlier versions of the MBCL required all 
benefit corporations to have a benefit director; the current version makes the benefit 
director entirely optional. See Loewenstein, Benefit Corporation Law, supra note 19, at 
389. But even in those corporations that choose to have a benefit director, that director—
like all other directors of the corporation—is to be elected by the shareholders. See 
MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. §	302(b) (2017), https://benefitcorp.net/sites/default/
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above, neither the law of corporate purpose nor fiduciary duties 
compel unblinking shareholder wealth maximization. It is instead the 
“power dynamics created by corporate law itself,”203 giving 
shareholders the exclusive franchise. Without changing this 
fundamental facet of the corporate structure, it is not clear that 
benefit corporation legislation actually achieves anything.204 Despite 
this fundamental reality, the “benefit” concept is now poised to be 
unthinkingly exported into the world of LLCs. 
II.  THE ADVENT OF BENEFIT LLCS 
The idea of expanding the benefit corporation construct to LLCs 
is not new. As already noted, when Maryland adopted its first-in-the-
nation benefit corporation statute, based on B Lab’s MBCL, it 
simultaneously adopted analogous amendments to its state LLC 
statute, authorizing the creation of the first benefit LLC.205 
Thereafter, however, only three other states embraced the idea of an 
unincorporated benefit entity before Delaware’s move in 2018.206 In 
2013, Oregon, like Maryland, simultaneously enacted amendments to 
both its corporation and LLC statutes authorizing both types of 




 203. Strine, Corporate Power Is Corporate Purpose II, supra note 199, at 1174. 
 204. As explained by the ABA committee that considered benefit corporation 
legislation: 
[L]egislation allowing directors to consider the interests of constituencies other 
than shareholders does not, by itself, disempower shareholders. .	.	. The 
shareholders of a benefit corporation who feel that directors are not sufficiently 
attentive to the interests of shareholders would still have access to all of the 
traditional tools available to shareholders with respect to changing the 
management of the corporation. 
Corp. Laws Comm., ABA Bus. Law Section, Benefit Corporation White Paper, 68 BUS. 
LAW. 1083, 1090 (2013); see also J. Haskell Murray, Adopting Stakeholder Advisory 
Boards, 54 AM. BUS. L.J. 61, 84 (2017) [hereinafter Murray, Adopting Stakeholder 
Advisory Boards] (“While benefit corporation shareholders may be more socially inclined 
than average, benefit corporation shareholders still have strong economic incentives .	.	. 
and may pressure boards with the corporate governance tools at their disposal (such as 
voting rights) to focus on the financial issues first.”). 
 205. See Act of May 19, 2011, ch. 500, 2011 Md. Laws 2955 (codified as amended at 
MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS §§	4A-1201 to -1208 (LEXIS through 2018 Reg. 
Sess.)). 
 206. A bill authorizing benefit LLCs was also introduced in the Illinois state senate, but 
the bill was never enacted. See S.B. 2358, 98th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2013). 
 207. See Act of June 4, 2013, ch. 269, 2013 Or. Laws 682 (codified at OR. REV. STAT. 
ANN. §§	60.750–.770 (Westlaw through 2018 Reg. Sess. & Spec. Sess.)). 
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authorize benefit LLCs.208 And in 2018, months before Delaware, 
Utah became the fourth state to enact benefit LLC legislation.209 
The fact that more states have not embraced benefit LLCs with 
the same vigor as they have benefit corporations is, in one sense, 
puzzling. In many respects, the more informal and tax-advantaged 
LLC form is better suited for socially minded entrepreneurs and 
purpose-driven start-ups than the more burdensome corporate 
form.210 One explanation for the failure of benefit LLC legislation to 
be adopted more broadly may be the fact that B Lab has not openly 
lobbied for it—at least not up until this point.211 A second explanation 
may be that, in contrast to benefit corporations, no one has 
articulated a plausible legal case to justify the existence of benefit 
LLCs. Whatever the reason, with Delaware’s embrace of the benefit 
LLC, 2018 will likely mark an inflection point, accelerating the spread 
of this new unincorporated statutory entity. 
Section A describes the extant benefit LLC statutes, including 
Delaware’s. Section B then explains that, given the inherent flexibility 
of conventional LLCs, as a legal matter, statutory benefit LLCs are a 
needless novelty. 
A. Benefit LLC Statutes 
With Delaware’s new statute, there are now two competing 
models of benefit LLC legislation: an unofficial B Lab-based model 
and Delaware’s. The differences between the two models closely 
track those highlighted above in the context of statutory benefit 
corporations.212 
 
 208. See Act of Nov. 21, 2016, No. 2016–170, 2016 Pa. Laws __ (codified at 15 PA. 
CONS. STAT. ANN. §§	8891–8898 (Westlaw through 2018 Reg. Sess. Act 164)). 
 209. See Act of Mar. 19, 2018, ch. 201, 2018 Utah Laws __ (codified at UTAH CODE 
ANN. §§	48-4-101 to -402 (LEXIS through 2018 3d Spec. Sess.)). 
 210. See Murray, Beneficial Benefit LLCs?, supra note 7, at 442 (observing that “most 
social enterprises appear to be relatively small” and attracted to the “simplicity and tax 
advantages of the [LLC] form”). Indeed, as Professor Ball notes, in Oregon, where both 
benefit LLCs and corporations are authorized, there are more benefit LLCs than 
corporations, which suggests the LLC form is better for small businesses. Ball, supra note 
4, at 943 n.107. 
 211. See Murray, Beneficial Benefit LLCs?, supra note 7, at 444 (citing B Lab’s lack of 
lobbying as the “main reason” benefit LLC statutes have not yet been widely adopted). 
More recently, Professor Murray reports that Bill Clark, the primary drafter of the MBCL 
and a B Lab affiliate, has commented positively on the expansion of the “benefit” concept 
to LLCs in Pennsylvania. See id. at 439. 
 212. See supra Section II.A. 
97 N.C. L. REV. 603 (2019) 
640 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 97 
1.  B Lab-Based Model 
Although B Lab has not promulgated an official model benefit 
LLC legislation, that did not stop Maryland, Oregon, Pennsylvania, 
and Utah from creating their own by borrowing liberally from B 
Lab’s MBCL and adapting it to LLCs.213 Thus, these states’ statutes 
represent an unofficial B Lab model for benefit LLCs. 
Each state’s benefit LLC statute largely parrots the language of 
the MBCL, including the statutorily required purpose of creating 
general public benefit214 and the optional purpose of creating a 
specific public benefit.215 Likewise, consistent with the MBCL, each 
state’s statute requires that those vested with the power to manage an 
LLC—members in a member-managed LLC and managers in a 
manager-managed LLC216—to “consider” the interests of not just the 
LLC’s members but the same list of various nonmember 
constituencies that may be affected by the company’s activities.217 
Finally, each state’s statute requires a benefit LLC to prepare and 
make publicly available an annual benefit report, assessing the 
performance of the LLC against the standards of an independent 
third party.218 
 
 213. See Murray, Beneficial Benefit LLCs?, supra note 7, at 439 (observing that the 
Oregon and Maryland benefit LLC statutes “largely follow” the MBCL as adopted by 
each state). 
 214. Compare MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS §	4A-1206(a) (LEXIS through 2018 
Reg. Sess.), and OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §	60.758(1) (Westlaw through 2018 Reg. Sess. & 
Spec. Sess.), and 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §	8894(a) (Westlaw through 2018 Reg. Sess. 
Act 164), and UTAH CODE ANN. §	48-4-201(1) (LEXIS through 2018 3d Spec. Sess.), with 
MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. §	201(a) (2017), https://benefitcorp.net/sites/default/
files/Model%20benefit%20corp%20legislation%20_4_17_17.pdf [https://perma.cc/W55T-
SPDS]. 
 215. Compare MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS §	4A-1206(b) (LEXIS through 2018 
Reg. Sess.), and OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §	60.758(2)(a) (Westlaw through 2018 Reg. Sess. & 
Spec. Sess.), and 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §	8894(b) (Westlaw through 2018 Reg. Sess. 
Act 164), and UTAH CODE ANN. §	48-4-201(2)(a) (LEXIS through 2018 3d Spec. Sess.), 
with MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. §	201(b) (2017), https://benefitcorp.net/sites/default/
files/Model%20benefit%20corp%20legislation%20_4_17_17.pdf [https://perma.cc/W55T-
SPDS]. 
 216. See REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT §	407 (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF 
COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 2006). 
 217. Compare MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS §	4A-1207(a) (LEXIS through 2018 
Reg. Sess.), and OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §	60.760(1) (Westlaw through 2018 Reg. Sess. & 
Spec. Sess.), and 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§	8895(a), 8896(a) (Westlaw through 2018 
Reg. Sess. Act 164), and UTAH CODE ANN. §	48-4-301 (LEXIS through 2018 3d Spec. 
Sess.), with MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. §	301(a) (2017), https://benefitcorp.net/sites/
default/files/Model%20benefit%20corp%20legislation%20_4_17_17.pdf [https://perma.cc/
W55T-SPDS]. 
 218. Compare MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS §	4A-1208 (LEXIS through 2018 
Reg. Sess.), and OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§	60.768, 60.770 (Westlaw through 2018 Reg. Sess. 
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2.  Delaware Model 
Unsurprisingly, Delaware’s new benefit LLC statute is based on 
its own benefit corporation statute rather than on B Lab’s MBCL. 
Thus, the differences between Delaware’s benefit LLC statute and 
the unofficial B Lab model are largely the same as those described 
earlier in the context of benefit corporations.219 
In particular, unlike the B Lab model and consistent with 
Delaware’s statute governing benefit corporations, Delaware’s new 
benefit LLC statute requires a benefit LLC to designate in its 
formation document a specific public benefit to be promoted by the 
LLC.220 Thus, like a Delaware benefit corporation, a Delaware 
benefit LLC must pursue both general public benefit221 and whatever 
specific public benefit that has been identified by the LLC.222 
Moreover, unlike the B Lab model, the Delaware benefit LLC 
statute requires a benefit LLC to produce a benefit report only 
biennially (and not annually)223 and to make that report available only 
to its members (and not publicly).224 Finally, like Delaware’s benefit 
 
& Spec. Sess.), and 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §	8898 (Westlaw through 2018 Reg. Sess. 
Act 164), and UTAH CODE ANN. §	48-4-401 (LEXIS through 2018 3d Spec. Sess.), with 
MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. §§	401, 402 (2017), https://benefitcorp.net/sites/default/
files/Model%20benefit%20corp%20legislation%20_4_17_17.pdf [https://perma.cc/W55T-
SPDS]. 
 219. See supra notes 70–78 and accompanying text. 
 220. Compare DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §	18-1202(a) (Supp. 2018) (requiring a benefit 
LLC to identify at least one specific public benefit in its certificate of formation), and id. 
tit. 8, §	362(a)(1) (2016) (requiring the same of a benefit corporation), with MODEL 
BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. §	201(b) (2017), https://benefitcorp.net/sites/default/files/
Model%20benefit%20corp%20legislation%20_4_17_17.pdf [https://perma.cc/W55T-SPDS] 
(providing that a specific public benefit is optional). 
 221. Compare tit. 6, §	18-1202(a) (requiring a benefit LLC “to operate in a responsible 
and sustainable manner”), with id. tit. 8, §	362(a) (2016) (requiring the same of a benefit 
corporation). As already noted, the mandate “to operate in a responsible and sustainable 
manner” is analogous to the “general public benefit” mandate under the MBCL. See supra 
note 68 and accompanying text. 
 222. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §	18-1202(a), (b) (Supp. 2018) (requiring a benefit 
LLC “produce public benefit” and defining “public benefit” to mean “a positive effect (or 
reduction of negative effects) on one or more categories of persons, entities, communities 
or interests (other than members in their capacities as members)”). 
 223. Compare tit. 6, §	18-1205 (requiring a benefit report biennially), with MODEL 
BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. §	401(a) (2017), https://benefitcorp.net/sites/default/files/Model%
20benefit%20corp%20legislation%20_4_17_17.pdf [https://perma.cc/W55T-SPDS] (requiring 
an annual benefit report). 
 224. Compare tit. 6, §	18-1205 (requiring a benefit report to be provided to the 
members), with MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. §	402 (2017), https://benefitcorp.net/sites/
default/files/Model%20benefit%20corp%20legislation%20_4_17_17.pdf [https://perma.cc/
W55T-SPDS] (requiring a benefit report to be provided to shareholders and made 
available publicly). 
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corporation statute, the state’s new benefit LLC statute does not 
require a benefit report to assess the LLC’s activities against the 
standards of an independent third party.225 
Although no other state has yet followed the Delaware benefit 
LLC model, with Delaware’s imprimatur, interest in the new 
unincorporated statutory form is likely to spread. And especially in 
those states that have already followed Delaware’s public benefit 
corporation statute, one might reasonably expect to see the adoption 
of statutes authorizing analogous benefit LLCs modeled on 
Delaware’s new statute. Yet, as the discussion below shows, there is 
no credible legal case to justify the existence of this new socially 
minded statutory business entity. 
B. Nonexistent Legal Justification for Benefit LLCs 
As already explained, the legal case for benefit corporations is 
quite thin.226 It is premised upon the dubious assertion that 
conventional corporate law inexorably mandates shareholder 
primacy, thus precluding purpose-driven social enterprises from 
utilizing the conventional corporate form to pursue a social agenda 
that might curb profits. 
Even if one accepts this dubious assertion, however, there is no 
similar justification that can be made in support of benefit LLCs.227 
No one has suggested that conventional LLC law mandates any form 
of “member primacy.” No one believes that conventional LLCs are 
legally committed to maximizing profits for the sole benefit of an 
LLC’s members. 
Instead, conventional LLC law allows for virtually unlimited 
flexibility as to the purpose and governance of the entity and, thus, is 
perfectly suitable for social enterprises.228 For example, conventional 
 
 225. Compare tit. 6, §	18-1205 (omitting any requirement for a benefit LLC to assess 
itself against the standards of a third party), with id. tit. 8, §	366(b) (2016) (omitting the 
same requirement in the benefit corporation context). 
 226. See supra Section I.C. 
 227. Murray, Beneficial Benefit LLCs?, supra note 7, at 448–49 (“[T]he legal 
justification for the benefit LLC is even weaker than the legal justification for the benefit 
corporation .	.	.	.”). 
 228. See ALEXANDER, supra note 3, at 154–55 (acknowledging that because “the LLC 
structure is sufficiently flexible to create a benefit corporation-like arrangement through 
private ordering,” statutory benefit LLCs “might not be necessary”); Cassady V. Brewer, 
A Novel Approach to Using LLCs for Quasi-Charitable Endeavors (A/K/A “Social 
Enterprise”), 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 678, 680 (2012) (“Because of their inherent 
contract-like flexibility, liability protection, and malleable tax treatment, limited liability 
companies are increasingly being used for social enterprise.”); Brett H. McDonnell, 
Committing to Doing Good and Doing Well: Fiduciary Duty in Benefit Corporations, 20 
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LLC statutes, including Delaware’s, provide that an LLC “may carry 
on any lawful business, purpose or activity, whether or not for 
profit,”229 thereby expressly contemplating that the pursuit of profits 
may not even be a goal of an LLC. Indeed, the use of conventional 
LLCs for purely philanthropic purposes is growing in popularity,230 
and there is no question a conventional LLC could also be structured 
to accommodate a for-profit social enterprise.231   
It is true that the individuals who manage the business and affairs 
of an LLC are bound by traditional fiduciary duties,232 and those 
duties largely mirror the fiduciary duties of corporate directors.233 
 
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 19, 26–27 (2014) (observing that the flexibility of the LLC 
form “provide[s] a viable alternative for social enterprises”); Molk, supra note 109, at 248 
(“LLCs certainly appear capable of providing the legal framework to pursue social 
enterprise .	.	.	.”); Murray, Beneficial Benefit LLCs?, supra note 7, at 441–42 (“By design, 
LLCs are extremely flexible, contract-based, and already perfectly able to mold to a social 
entrepreneur’s desires. The availability of the traditional LLC form renders the addition 
of the benefit LLC largely superfluous.”); Murray, Choose Your Own Master, supra note 
2, at 19 (“[LLCs] are famously flexible, and operating agreements can be altered to meet 
the needs of social entrepreneurs.”); Reiser, supra note 43, at 608 (“Typically, LLC law 
will be flexible enough to allow adoption of both profit and social purposes .	.	.	.”); see also 
Ann E. Conaway, The Global Use of the Delaware Limited Liability Company for 
Socially-Driven Purposes, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 772, 816 (2012) (arguing that 
Delaware LLCs are the best statutory business entity for social enterprises). 
 229. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §	18-106(a) (2016) (emphasis added); accord REVISED 
UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT §	104(b) (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE 
LAWS 2006) (“A limited liability company may have any lawful purpose, regardless of 
whether for profit.”). 
 230. See Cassady V. Brewer, Lisa A. Runquist & Elizabeth Carrott Minnigh, Nonprofit 
LLCs, BUS. L. TODAY, Mar. 2017, at 1, 3. Most famously, Mark Zuckerberg, the founder 
and CEO of Facebook, Inc., and his spouse, a medical doctor, launched the philanthropic 
Chan-Zuckerberg Initiative, which is organized as a conventional Delaware LLC. See 
Natasha Singer & Mike Isaac, Zuckerberg’s Philanthropy Uses L.L.C. for More Control, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2015, at B1. The Initiative describes itself as “a new kind of 
philanthropic organization that brings together world-class engineering, grant-making, 
impact investing, policy, and advocacy work” with a focus on “supporting science through 
basic biomedical research and education through personalized learning” and “equal 
opportunity including access to affordable housing and criminal justice reform.” See 
About, CHAN ZUCKERBERG INITIATIVE, https://www.chanzuckerberg.com/about 
[https://perma.cc/879B-W9H7]. 
 231. See, e.g., Molk, supra note 109, at 247 (“LLCs enjoy almost limitless freedom to 
craft their operating agreements; language that requires adherence to social enterprise 
objectives should not be a problem.”). 
 232. See, e.g., REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT §	409 (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF 
COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 2006) (codifying fiduciary duties under LLC law); 
Mohsen Manesh, Equity in LLC Law?, 44 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 93, 101 (2016) [hereinafter 
Manesh, Equity in LLC Law?] (summarizing fiduciary duties under Delaware LLC law). 
 233. See, e.g., Auriga Capital Corp. v. Gatz Props., LLC, 40 A.3d 839, 850–51, 855 n.65 
(Del. Ch. 2012) (Strine, C.), aff’d, 59 A.3d 1206 (Del. 2012) (analogizing the fiduciary 
duties owed in the corporate context to the fiduciary duties owed in a manager-managed 
LLC); REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT §	409(b)–(c) (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF 
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Thus, in theory, one might be concerned that courts, borrowing from 
corporate law, will import analogous concepts of “member primacy” 
and “member wealth maximization” into LLCs.234 Unlike corporation 
statutes, however, LLC statutes are quite explicit that fiduciary duties 
may be contractually modified or even eliminated.235 Indeed, every 
matter of internal governance—from the purpose of an LLC to who 
can make decisions and take actions on behalf of the entity, to the 
process that must be undertaken, and the constituencies to be 
considered in making any decision on behalf of an LLC—may be 
contractually specified in the terms of an LLC’s operating 
agreement.236 To emphasize this point, Delaware’s LLC statute 
famously proclaims as its guiding policy “to give the maximum effect 
to the principle of freedom of contract and to the enforceability of 
[LLC] agreements.”237 
Nonetheless, one might be concerned that the contractual 
flexibility afforded under LLC law works in both directions: that the 
terms in an LLC’s operating agreement committing the entity to 
pursue public benefit may be later amended by the members of the 
LLC. Thus, unlike the mandatory rules set forth in a benefit LLC 
statute, the terms of an operating agreement cannot credibly commit 
a conventional LLC to a prosocial agenda. But this concern is 
groundless. First, a business formed as a benefit LLC can already, 
with the approval of a requisite majority of its members, convert itself 
into a conventional LLC, thus abandoning the statutory mandate to 
pursue public benefit.238 Second, conventional LLC law affords 
members the flexibility to stipulate certain terms of an operating 
agreement (for example, those committing the LLC to pursue public 
 
COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 2006) (codifying fiduciary duties of loyalty and care 
under LLC law). 
 234. See Murray, Beneficial Benefit LLCs?, supra note 7, at 438 (stating that some 
drafters of Oregon’s benefit LLC statute were motivated, in part, “to combat any future 
common law creep from the corporation-focused case of eBay into the LLC area”). 
 235. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §	18-1101(c) (Supp. 2018) (“To the extent that, at law 
or in equity, a member or manager .	.	. has duties (including fiduciary duties) .	.	. the 
member’s or manager’s .	.	. duties may be expanded or restricted or eliminated by 
provisions in the limited liability company agreement .	.	.	.”); REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. 
CO. ACT §	110(d) (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 2006) 
(authorizing an LLC operating agreement to restrict, alter, or event eliminate fiduciary 
duties, except where doing so would be “manifestly unreasonable”). 
 236. See, e.g., Manesh, Equity in LLC Law?, supra note 232, at 102–06 (describing the 
contractual freedom afforded under LLC law); see also Manesh, Delaware and the Market 
for LLC Law, supra note 62, at 225–34 (same); Peter Molk, How Do LLC Owners 
Contract Around Default Statutory Protections?, 42 J. CORP. L. 503, 508–13 (2017) (same). 
 237. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §	18-1101(b) (Supp. 2018). 
 238. See, e.g., id. §	18-1203(b). 
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benefit and account for the interests of nonmember constituencies) 
cannot be amended without the unanimous consent of the 
members,239 making the entity’s commitment to pursue public benefit 
even stronger than the commitment created by merely organizing as a 
benefit LLC.240 
Indeed, given the inherent flexibility of conventional LLC law, 
every scholar and practitioner who has ever considered the issue has 
concluded that benefit LLC legislation is unnecessary.241 In the words 
of one leading scholar of social enterprises, “virtually all legal experts 
agree that [conventional] LLC statutes are flexible enough to 
accommodate social entrepreneurs.”242 Even B Lab acknowledges this 
reality.243 In fact, B Lab has long offered model contract language that 
can be incorporated into an LLC’s operating agreement,244 thus 
providing a readymade, “off-the-rack” framework to translate benefit 
corporation principles in the context of an LLC.245 
In this respect, Delaware’s new benefit LLC legislation is 
particularly extraordinary because it represents a fundamental 
departure from the flexibility traditionally associated with the LLC 
form.246 The provisions of the state’s benefit LLC statute purport to 
be mandatory for benefit LLCs, inalterable and not subject to the 
 
 239. See id. §	18-302(e) (“If a limited liability company agreement provides for the 
manner in which it may be amended .	.	. it may be amended only in that manner .	.	.	.”); see 
also REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT §	110(a)(4) (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS 
ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 2006) (“[T]he operating agreement governs .	.	. the means and 
conditions for amending the operating agreement.”). 
 240. See Molk, supra note 109, at 246–47. 
 241. See supra note 228 and accompanying text. 
 242. Murray, Beneficial Benefit LLCs?, supra note 7, at 445. 
 243. See ALEXANDER, supra note 3, at 65 (“For [LLCs], a more flexible form of 
business entity, B Lab determined that binding commitments to stakeholders could be 
made in the operating agreement, the primary constitutional document of an LLC.”); see 
also Murray, Choose Your Own Master, supra note 2, at 23 n.101 (reporting that the 
primary drafter of the MBCL and B Lab’s outside counsel agrees that “LLC law is 
generally flexible enough to accomplish social enterprise purposes”). 
 244. See B Lab, LLC Legal Roadmap, CERTIFIED B CORP., https://web.archive.org/
web/20180227082442/https://www.bcorporation.net/become-a-b-corp/how-to-become-a-
b-corp/legal-roadmap/llc-legal-roadmap [https://perma.cc/6RQX-8AUK]. 
 245. One might argue that benefit LLC statutes provide a useful “off-the-rack” 
solution for social enterprises that prefer the LLC form, “sav[ing] cash-strapped start-ups 
the need to have legal counsel draft bespoke provisions.” See ALEXANDER, supra note 3, 
at 155; accord Murray, Beneficial Benefit LLCs?, supra note 7, at 442 (articulating a 
similar argument). But B Lab’s model language for LLC operating agreements 
demonstrates that a readymade solution is already freely available, without the need for a 
new statutory business form. 
 246. See Murray, Beneficial Benefit LLCs?, supra note 7, at 443 (noting the disconnect 
between the mandatory rules of benefit LLC statutes and the “intentional flexibility of the 
traditional LLC form”). 
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freedom-of-contract principle that undergirds all other aspects of 
LLCs.247 Undoubtedly, the mandatory nature of the benefit LLC 
statute reflects a desire to ensure a degree of uniformity—in purpose, 
governance, rights, and obligations—of all Delaware benefit LLCs. 
But every single feature, right, or obligation mandated by Delaware’s 
new benefit LLC statute could have already been achieved by a 
conventional LLC through private ordering. From that perspective, 
not only is the statutory benefit LLC totally unnecessary but it is also 
in conflict with the contractual flexibility that has historically made 
the LLC such a popular form of business. 
III.  THE POLICY CASE AGAINST STATUTORY BENEFIT ENTITIES 
Without a plausible legal justification for its existence, the 
benefit LLC plainly reveals what was arguably already apparent in 
the context of its corporate predecessor: the aim of benefit entity 
statutes is not law reform. The purpose of benefit entity legislation 
has never really been to address some perceived shortcoming in the 
existing legal frameworks governing conventional business entities. 
Instead, the real aim of benefit entity statutes is to facilitate 
branding.248 Benefit entity legislation is about creating a state-
sponsored brand for for-profit businesses to use to signal their virtue 
to consumers, investors, and the broader public.249 
Indeed, B Lab has not been coy about the importance of its 
legislation to facilitate such branding.250 Alongside the facile legal 
 
 247. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §	18-1201 (Supp. 2018). 
 248. See Molk, supra note 109, at 248 (arguing that the principal motivation of 
advocates for benefit corporation statutes “appears to be the marketing value that 
organizing as a social enterprise-specific organizational form brings”); Murray, Choose 
Your Own Master, supra note 2, at 44 (“One of the most talked about benefits that social 
enterprise offers to its owners is branding.”); Murray, The Social Enterprise Law Market, 
supra note 9, at 559 (“One of the often-cited benefits of social enterprise legislation is the 
branding or signaling aspect .	.	.	.”). 
 249. See Murray, Beneficial Benefit LLCs?, supra note 7, at 447–48 (observing that 
“[t]he main benefit of the benefit LLC form is the signaling provided by choosing the 
form” and that for many entrepreneurs the signaling function is the most important 
consideration in selecting an appropriate business form); Reiser, supra note 43, at 621 
(“Social entrepreneurs wish to market their enterprises and their products to consumers, 
partners, and employees as meaningfully different from either traditional nonprofits or 
for-profits and view a hybrid form [like a benefit corporation or benefit LLC] as one route 
to accomplish this goal.”). 
 250. See ALEXANDER, supra note 3, at 154–55 (arguing that although benefit LLCs 
“might not be necessary” given the inherent flexibility of conventional LLCs, a 
conventional LLC “does not allow companies to differentiate themselves from the 
competition with a recognizable entity form,” whereas a benefit LLC “provides a measure 
of uniformity, so that investors, workers, customers, and other[s] .	.	. can recognize the 
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argument made in support of benefit corporation legislation, B Lab 
has emphasized the value of creating an easily recognizable signal for 
socially minded consumers, workers, and investors.251 Benefit entity 
statutes facilitate this signaling function by providing socially minded 
businesses the statutory “benefit” moniker to distinguish themselves 
from businesses organized as conventional corporations and LLCs, 
which are presumably less virtuous or altruistic.252 
The central importance of branding to B Lab is reflected in its 
dogged insistence that all states considering benefit corporation 
legislation adhere closely to B Lab’s model statute.253 Uniformity in 
state statutes helps build and reinforce the brand—what it means to 
be a statutory “benefit corporation.”254 Where a state charts its own 
 
benefit ‘brand’”); CLARK ET AL., supra note 3, at 1 (emphasizing the “clear market 
differentiation” offered by benefit corporations); Houlahan et al., supra note 3, at 300 
(“We promoted [benefit corporations] because [we] want all stakeholders to be able to 
distinguish good companies from good marketing.”). 
 251. See CLARK ET AL., supra note 3, at 2–6 (justifying benefit corporations based 
upon the market demand for socially responsible businesses). 
 252. See ALEXANDER, supra note 3, at 155 (“In a marketplace where ‘greenwashing’ is 
common, a legal change of structure .	.	. to [a] benefit corporation can signal the 
company’s commitment to its core values.”); Dorff, Assessing the Assessment, supra note 
21, at 516 (“Benefit corporations advertise themselves as different from ordinary, for-
profit companies. They are better, more responsible, and kinder, and should therefore be 
treated differently.”); Dorff, Why Public Benefit Corporations?, supra note 13, at 104 
(“[B]eing a [benefit corporation] may generate enhanced credibility for a company’s 
assertion that it is helping the world in a meaningful way.”); Molk, supra note 109, at 248 
(“Organizing as a benefit [entity] sends a clear signal to the socially conscious public that 
the organization prioritizes social good; organizing as [a conventional entity] sends no 
signal .	.	.	.”); Murray, Beneficial Benefit LLCs?, supra note 7, at 446 (noting that 
organizing as a benefit entity “signals a commitment to ‘benefit’ society and the 
environment” in contrast to a conventional entity “that provides no such signal—or maybe 
even a signal that profit is paramount”); Murray, Choose Your Own Master, supra note 2, 
at 44 (“Branding is .	.	. beneficial because it can help customers and investors quickly 
identify socially and environmentally responsible companies.”); Tu, supra note 21, at 160 
(“Benefit Corporation status can serve a signaling function that gives interested parties a 
meaningful method of[] differentiation.”). 
 253. See Callison, Benefit Corporations, supra note 52, at 161–63 (describing the 
aggressive opposition of B Lab and its affiliates to the efforts of the Colorado Bar 
Association Business Law Section to propose legislation that deviated from the MBCL); 
Loewenstein, Benefit Corporations: A Challenge, supra note 19, at 1034 (noting, based on 
the author’s personal experiences with B Lab, that “unless proposed state benefit 
corporation legislation substantially conforms to the [MBCL], [B Lab] will actively oppose 
it and lobby for the Model Legislation”). 
 254. See Loewenstein, Benefit Corporation Law, supra note 19, at 382 (explaining that 
uniformity in benefit corporation statutes allows investors, consumers, and others to 
assume certain core features irrespective of where the benefit corporation is organized); 
see also Loewenstein, Benefit Corporations: A Challenge, supra note 19, at 1034 (“[T]he 
branding effect [of benefit corporations] would be lost, or at least significantly diminished, 
if more flexible benefit corporation statutes, varying widely from state to state, were to be 
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path and creates a new socially minded statutory business form that 
eschews the MBCL template, B Lab bitterly disowns the state’s 
statute.255 
The significance of branding is likewise reflected in the 
mandatory nature of many of the statutory rules governing benefit 
entities under both the B Lab and Delaware models.256 Rather than 
supplying merely default rules of governance and allowing each 
business to tailor those rules through private ordering, as is common 
for conventional business entity statutes, both the B Lab and 
Delaware benefit entity statutes impose several mandatory rules. 
These unwaivable, inalterable rules—regarding, among other things, 
a business’s public benefit purpose, the requirement that the 
business’s managers consider the interests of all who may be affected 
by the business’s activities, and requirements concerning benefit 
reporting—ensure consistency among all businesses organized as a 
benefit entity, again reinforcing the “benefit” brand.257 
But if the sole, or even primary, justification for benefit entity 
legislation is to create a state-endorsed designation and make that 
designation available to private, for-profit businesses to signal their 
altruism and virtue, then one should be sharply skeptical that such 
legislation is an appropriate or worthwhile use of state power. As 
detailed in Section A, existing benefit entity statutes offer no 
accountability—no means to ensure that businesses that organize as a 
benefit corporation or LLC are in any way deserving of the “benefit” 
 
adopted.”); Murray, Social Enterprise Innovation, supra note 4, at 357 (“[T]ension often 
exists between branding and private ordering. Maintenance of a useful brand associated 
with a group of companies generally requires a fair level of consistency, often achieved 
through mandatory rules.”). 
 255. See Callison, Benefit Corporations, supra note 52, at 163 (“[W]hat [B Lab] really 
cares about is the name ‘benefit corporation’ .	.	.	.”); Loewenstein, Benefit Corporation 
Law, supra note 19, at 382 (“B Lab and its supporters have been insistent that jurisdictions 
considering benefit corporation legislation adhere to the principles of the Model 
Legislation or eschew the term benefit corporation, even though B Lab does not own any 
rights to the term.”). Although B Lab has embraced Delaware’s benefit corporation 
statute despite its deviations from the MBCL, B Lab has been critical of other alternatives 
to the MBCL. See, e.g., CLARK ET AL., supra note 3, app. C. 
 256. See MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. §	101(d) (2017), https://benefitcorp.net/sites/
default/files/Model%20benefit%20corp%20legislation%20_4_17_17.pdf [https://perma.cc/
W55T-SPDS] (“A provision of the articles of incorporation or bylaws of a benefit 
corporation may not limit, be inconsistent with, or supersede a provision of [the 
MBCL].”); accord DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §	18-1201 (Supp. 2018). 
 257. Cf. Welch & Saunders, supra note 158, at 865–66 (observing that mandatory rules 
in Delaware’s conventional corporate law facilitate branding for Delaware corporations). 
Of course, in addition to facilitating branding, advocates of benefit corporations might 
argue that the mandatory statutory provisions are necessary to ensure a firm’s prosocial 
commitment. 
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moniker that is bestowed upon them with the state’s imprimatur. 
Worse yet, as described in Section B, benefit entity legislation 
imposes its own costs, creating needless complexity in the legal system 
and fostering misimpressions about conventional for-profit 
businesses. Moreover, as noted in Section C, state-sponsored 
legislation is altogether unnecessary to enable socially minded 
businesses to distinguish themselves; private certifications awarded by 
nongovernmental organizations, like B Lab, already accomplish this 
function. Given these considerations, the cost-benefit analysis easily 
tips against statutory benefit entities—both benefit corporations and, 
especially, LLCs. 
A. State-Sponsored Branding Without Accountability 
If the principal aim of benefit entity legislation is to create a 
state-sanctioned designation for for-profit businesses that are 
distinctly purpose driven and socially minded, then such legislation 
should presumably provide some means of accountability.258 
Specifically, the legislation should include some measures to ensure 
that any business that is organized as a benefit corporation or LLC is 
deserving of the “benefit” label. Otherwise, the state-sponsored label 
risks misleading unsuspecting customers, investors, and the public 
into believing that self-proclaimed “benefit” businesses are in fact 
more virtuous or altruistic than businesses organized as conventional 
corporations or LLCs.259 
The problem is that existing benefit entity statutes offer no 
accountability—no means for the public to ensure that a benefit 
entity will pursue or produce public benefit any more or differently 
 
 258. See Loewenstein, Benefit Corporations: A Challenge, supra note 19, at 1016 
(“Presumably, the benefit corporation should be accountable to the public and its 
stakeholders if it is organized as a ‘benefit corporation.’”). 
 259. See Kennan El Khatib, Comment, The Harms of the Benefit Corporation, 65 AM. 
U. L. REV. 151, 185 (2015) (“The creation of the benefit corporation has created a false 
dichotomy between traditional corporations and benefit corporations .	.	.	, foster[ing] the 
illusion that benefit corporations are automatically more socially and environmentally 
conscious than traditional corporations.”); see also Murray, The Social Enterprise Law 
Market, supra note 9, at 560–61 (“‘[B]enefit corporation[]’ .	.	. connote[s] a focus on the 
society at large. The public does not generally take the time to dive into the nuances of 
corporate law, therefore, the name of the entity form may be important in the initial 
shaping of the public’s view of the entity.”). But see Molk, supra note 109, at 254 (arguing 
that, in light of the weaknesses in the statutory benefit corporation framework, “the signal 
of being a ‘benefit corporation’ .	.	. as one pursuing social enterprise will not be 
particularly credible”). 
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than a business organized as a conventional corporation or LLC.260 
Like conventional corporation and LLC law, benefit entity statutes 
leave the owners of the business—corporate shareholders and LLC 
members—in the same privileged position of being the sole 
constituency empowered to (directly or indirectly) control the 
business.261 And nothing in benefit entity statutes meaningfully 
restricts those owners in deciding how and to what extent, if at all, to 
pursue public good.262 
Instead, as described below, benefit entity statutes are larded 
with unenforceable, illusory commitments, a farcical enforcement 
mechanism for those commitments, and an unserious, self-serving 
disclosure mandate. Consequently, self-proclaimed benefit entities 
are, as a practical matter, indistinguishable from conventional for-
profit entities: they will only pursue public benefit if, and only to the 
extent that, their owners choose to do so.263 
1.  Illusory Commitments 
The legal commitments made by a business embracing the state-
sponsored designation of a benefit entity are astonishingly vague and 
entirely illusory. As already explained, benefit entity statutes merely 
require a business to, in the language of the MBCL, create a 
“material positive impact on society and the environment”264 or, in 
 
 260. See J. William Callison, Putting New Sheets on a Procrustean Bed: How Benefit 
Corporations Address Fiduciary Duties, the Dangers Created, and Suggestions for Change, 
2 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 85, 110 (2012) [hereinafter Callison, Putting New Sheets on a 
Procrustean Bed] (“[T]here is no enforcement mechanism to ensure that corporations 
which fail to seek general public benefit do not latch on to the benefit corporation 
moniker and the developing marketplace for social enterprises.”); Dorff, Assessing the 
Assessment, supra note 21, at 516–17 (describing the statutory safeguards against misuse of 
the benefit corporation as “toothless”); Dorff, Why Public Benefit Corporations?, supra 
note 13, at 109 (observing, in the context of Delaware public benefit corporations, that 
“the legal form does very little to prevent founders from adopting the appearance of a 
prosocial organization while abandoning the substance”); Reiser, supra note 43, at 611 
(“At the moment, benefit corporations require only formal articulation of a dual mission, 
and oversight over the genuineness of these statements is lacking.”). 
 261. See Strine, Making It Easier for Directors, supra note 43, at 245 (“[The] ultimate 
success [of the benefit corporation model] depend[s] on .	.	. investors who not only mouth 
the belief that corporations should be managed for the best interests of all .	.	. but in fact 
act on that belief [in] real world investing and voting decisions .	.	.	.”). 
 262. See id. at 246 (“[B]ecause only stockholders are given rights under [benefit 
corporation statutes] .	.	. [t]here is a legitimate concern that the [stockholders] will simply 
abandon their principles and demand [a corporation’s board to maximize profits].”). 
 263. See supra notes 195–204 and accompanying text. 
 264. MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. §	102 (2017), https://benefitcorp.net/sites/default/
files/Model%20benefit%20corp%20legislation%20_4_17_17.pdf [https://perma.cc/W55T-
SPDS] (defining “general public benefit”); see id. at §	201(a). 
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the language of Delaware’s statutes, “produce a public benefit or 
public benefits and to operate in a responsible and sustainable 
manner.”265 Of course, one does not need a law degree to recognize 
that these standards are so vague as to be meaningless and, therefore, 
unenforceable.266 A business might plausibly assert that its production 
of a good or service for which there exists public demand, its use of 
carbon-saving LED bulbs rather than incandescent bulbs, or its 
employment of workers who might otherwise be unemployed or 
employed in less desirable positions are all a “public benefit.”267 Put 
differently, any business could characterize its existing practices or 
policies as creating a “material positive impact on society and the 
environment.”268 
 
 265. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §	362(a) (2016) (governing benefit corporations); id. 
tit. 6, §	18-1202(a) (Supp. 2018) (governing benefit LLCs). 
 266. See Callison, Benefit Corporations, supra note 52, at 153 (“‘General public benefit’ 
is a mish-mash that lacks any .	.	. fiduciary duty limits and contains few restrictions to 
hamper the freedom of self-interested directors .	.	.	. The door is opened for directors who 
act in self-interested fashion to point to some nebulous public benefit justification.”); 
Dorff, Why Public Benefit Corporations?, supra note 13, at 109–10 (observing, in the 
context of Delaware’s public benefit corporation statute, that the meaning of 
“responsible,” “sustainable,” and “public benefit” is “extremely broad” and “less than 
clear”); Loewenstein, Benefit Corporations: A Challenge, supra note 19, at 1025 (“[T]he 
general public purpose does not delineate specific covenants or undertakings of the 
benefit corporation that a third party could match up against the actions taken by the 
corporation; rather, it sets forth a vague and general aspiration.”); Loewenstein, Benefit 
Corporation Law, supra note 19, at 390 (“The general public benefit is, in essence, an 
aspiration of the benefit corporation; having a positive effect on society and the 
environment is unmeasurable and, therefore, not amenable to an opinion that the benefit 
corporation ‘acted in accordance’ with that aspiration ‘in all material respects.’” (quoting 
MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. §	302(c)(1) (2017), https://benefitcorp.net/sites/default/
files/Model%20benefit%20corp%20legislation%20_4_17_17.pdf [https://perma.cc/W55T-
SPDS])); Murray, Choose Your Own Master, supra note 2, at 30 (criticizing the mandatory 
“general public benefit purpose” as “too vague because it does not provide a practical way 
for directors to make decisions”); Yockey, supra note 111, at 794 (“The ability to justify 
decisions by citing vague public benefit requirements or stakeholder interests could give 
managers ‘broad cover’ .	.	.	. [T]he wide range of interests that directors must consider 
arguably makes them answerable to none.” (quoting Liam Pleven, When Doing Good 
Meets Investing, WALL ST. J. (July 12, 2013, 6:05 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
SB10001424127887324694904578598231690128560 [http://perma.cc/9GNW-9U98 (dark 
archive)])). 
 267. To be sure, under the MBCL (but not under Delaware law), a business’s public 
benefit must be assessed against a “third-party standard.” See §	102. But as explained 
below, there are several reasons to be dubious about the accountability created by the 
“third-party standard” requirements. See infra Section III.A.3. 
 268. §	102 (defining “general public benefit”); see Alicia E. Plerhoples, Delaware 
Public Benefit Corporations 90 Days Out: Who’s Opting In?, 14 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 247, 
265 (2014) (observing that under Delaware’s statute “companies in the technology, 
healthcare, and education sectors easily meet the minimal requirements of the public 
benefit corporation form, because positive ‘educational,’ ‘medical,’ and ‘technological’ 
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The statutory mandate that the managers of a benefit entity 
“consider” or “balance” the interests of constituencies beyond the 
owners of the business is likewise precatory and, thus, unenforceable. 
To merely “consider” such interests, as is required by the MBCL,269 is 
a trivial burden270—one that it would be impossible to show that a 
business’s managers failed to meet.271 Indeed, to “consider” various 
stakeholder interests does not mean that the managers of a self-
proclaimed benefit business will make decisions any differently than if 
there were no such statutory mandate.272 After all, even a business 
operating strictly on a profit-maximizing paradigm would need to 
“consider” the impact of its actions on various nonowner 
constituencies in order to operate most profitably.273 
The obligation to “balance” such interests, as is required under 
Delaware’s benefit entity statutes,274 is no different and, therefore, 
 
effects are each considered a ‘public benefit’ by the Delaware statutory provisions 
governing public benefit corporations”). 
 269. See MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. §	301(a) (2017), https://benefitcorp.net/sites/
default/files/Model%20benefit%20corp%20legislation%20_4_17_17.pdf [https://perma.cc/
W55T-SPDS]. 
 270. See Loewenstein, Benefit Corporations: A Challenge, supra note 19, at 1026 
(observing that the statutory obligation to “consider” could be easily satisfied by “each 
board decision on whatever matter [being] accompanied by a pro forma preamble reciting 
that, in making a certain decision, the board considered the effect of that decision on the 
listed constituencies”). 
 271. See Callison, Putting New Sheets on a Procrustean Bed, supra note 260, at 108–09 
(criticizing the MBCL for freeing directors of accountability to any one constituency or 
goal); see also Loewenstein, Benefit Corporations: A Challenge, supra note 19, at 1026–27 
(same); Murray, Choose Your Own Master, supra note 2, at 28, 33–34 (same); Yockey, 
supra note 111, at 794 (same). 
 272. See Clark & Babson, supra note 5, at 850 (conceding that the statutory mandate to 
consider various constituencies “does not require a particular outcome of directors’ 
decision-making”); Reiser, supra note 43, at 599–600 (“The broad discretion benefit 
corporation statutes accord to directors can .	.	. be faulted for giving directors unbridled 
discretion .	.	.	.”); Regina Robson, A New Look at Benefit Corporations: Game Theory and 
Game Changer, 52 AM. BUS. L.J. 501, 546 (2015) (“There is nothing in the MBCL that 
prohibits [benefit corporation directors]––after giving due consideration to multiple 
stakeholder interests––from choosing to give priority to shareholder interests.”). 
 273. See, e.g., Stefan J. Padfield, The Role of Corporate Personality Theory in Opting 
Out of Shareholder Wealth Maximization, 19 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 415, 443 
(2017) (“[I]t is incorrect to say that ‘regular corporations .	.	. cannot take into 
consideration social factors’ because social factors impact the shareholder wealth analysis, 
and not always negatively. In fact, in determining the best path to maximizing shareholder 
value, corporations arguably must consider social factors in order to satisfy their duty of 
care to become informed of all material information reasonably available.”). 
 274. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §	365(a) (2016) (governing benefit corporations); id. 
tit. 6, §	18-1202(a) (Supp. 2018) (governing benefit LLCs). 
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subject to the same criticisms.275 To “balance” means that managers 
must merely give some weight to the interests of stakeholders, not 
that stakeholder interests should bear equal weight as the owners’ 
interests.276 “Balancing” can thus result in giving the interests of 
stakeholders so little weight as to allow the owners’ interests to 
predominate.277 Consequently, like the statutory obligation to 
“consider,” the obligation to “balance” is an illusory commitment that 
leaves an entity’s manager with essentially unfettered discretion.278 
2.  Farcical Enforcement 
The sole legal vehicle aimed at ensuring that a self-proclaimed 
benefit entity actually fulfills its otherwise illusory statutory 
commitments is the benefit enforcement proceeding.279 But as an 
accountability mechanism, the benefit enforcement proceeding is 
farcical. 
To begin with, standing to bring such a proceeding is limited to a 
benefit entity’s owners.280 But the owners suffer from an obvious 
conflict of interest: the owners stand to gain financially from the 
business’s profits and, therefore, have a disincentive to bring a benefit 
enforcement action that might potentially interfere with the 
business’s profit making.281 In contrast to the entity’s owners, 
 
 275. See Murray, Social Enterprise Innovation, supra note 4, at 355 n.64 (reporting that 
one drafter of Delaware’s benefit corporation statute viewed the difference between 
“balance” and “consider” as minor and unimportant). 
 276. See id. 
 277. See id. 
 278. See ALEXANDER, supra note 3, at 92 (“Though the statute mandates .	.	. balancing 
.	.	. it does not mandate any particular outcome .	.	.	.”). 
 279. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §	367 (2016) (governing Delaware benefit 
corporations); id. tit. 6, §	18-1206 (Supp. 2018) (governing Delaware benefit LLCs); 
MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. §	305(a) (2017), https://benefitcorp.net/sites/default/files/
Model%20benefit%20corp%20legislation%20_4_17_17.pdf [https://perma.cc/W55T-SPDS]. 
 280. See tit. 8, §	367 (governing Delaware benefit corporations); id. tit. 6, §	18-1206 
(Supp. 2018) (governing Delaware benefit LLCs); MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. 
§	305(c) (2017), https://benefitcorp.net/sites/default/files/Model%20benefit%20corp%20
legislation%20_4_17_17.pdf [https://perma.cc/W55T-SPDS]. The MBCL also authorizes 
the corporation to bring such a proceeding, but it is implausible that directors would 
authorize a corporation to do so. See Loewenstein, Benefit Corporation Law, supra note 
19, at 387. 
 281. See Reiser, supra note 43, at 613 (“If a benefit corporation begins veering away 
from its dual mission to achieve greater profits, shareholders stand to gain financially from 
this decision.”); see also Murray, An Early Report on Benefit Reports, supra note 39, at 45 
(“While the shareholders might be adequate guardians of their own interests, it does not 
seem likely that shareholders will do an adequate job defending the interests of the 
general public.”); Murray, The Social Enterprise Law Market, supra note 9, at 550 
(“Shareholders may not have significant incentives to keep directors accountable to other 
stakeholders, especially when doing so reduces the shareholders’ financial returns.”). 
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nonowners—those who might benefit from the business’s purported 
public benefit purpose and otherwise do not suffer from the same 
financial conflict of interest—are expressly denied standing to bring a 
benefit enforcement proceeding.282 Likewise, no governmental 
regulator has standing to bring a benefit enforcement proceeding, 
despite the “benefit” designation that is generously granted with the 
state’s imprimatur.283 
Setting aside the stark conflict of interest problem, there are 
other reasons to be skeptical about the benefit enforcement 
proceeding as a viable accountability mechanism. To name one, 
virtually all benefit entities are closely held businesses284 in which 
there is typically substantial, if not complete, overlap between the 
business’s owners and the individuals who serve as its managers. In 
that context, it is absurd to expect the owners to sue themselves in 
their managerial capacity to enforce the business’s statutory 
commitment to create public benefit.285 
Even when owners do not themselves serve as managers of a 
benefit entity, as already noted, the owners—and not any other 
nonowner constituency—have the sole right to appoint the entity’s 
managers, whether it is through the election of corporate directors by 
shareholder vote or the appointment of an LLC’s managers pursuant 
 
 282. See Loewenstein, Benefit Corporation Law, supra note 19, at 388 (“[T]he persons 
with the greatest incentive to sue the benefit corporation—the beneficiaries of its specific 
public benefit—are expressly denied standing [to bring a benefit enforcement 
proceeding].”); see also Loewenstein, Benefit Corporations: A Challenge, supra note 19, at 
1021 (“Perhaps the best judges of the effectiveness of [a benefit] corporation’s efforts are 
the supposed beneficiaries of its benefit purposes [but those beneficiaries] are denied 
standing under the [MBCL].”); Murray, Social Enterprise Innovation, supra note 4, at 362 
(“The fact that other stakeholders cannot bring a claim creates some doubt that the 
benefit enforcement proceedings alone will give third parties confidence in the social value 
created by benefit corporations.”). 
 283. See Loewenstein, Benefit Corporations: A Challenge, supra note 19, at 1021–22; 
Reiser, supra note 43, at 613 (observing that, in contrast to nonprofits, “[t]here is no 
regulatory role for any public official in the benefit corporation”). 
 284. See Loewenstein, Benefit Corporation Law, supra note 19, at 386 (observing that 
“almost all benefit corporations [are] privately held businesses”); Winston, supra note 39, 
at 1829 (“[M]ost benefit corporations are currently small companies that are privately 
owned .	.	.	.”). 
 285. See Dorff, Why Public Benefit Corporations?, supra note 13, at 104–05 (“Only 
shareholders have standing to sue to enforce the [directors’ statutory duties], and in 
closely held [benefit corporations], the shareholders are likely to be the same people as 
the directors. Barring a rift among the shareholders, then, there seems little chance of a 
lawsuit.”); Winston, supra note 39, at 1829 (“In a small, privately owned benefit 
corporation [where] there is substantial overlap among the officers, directors, and 
shareholders[,] .	.	. the shareholders cannot be effective enforcers of mission because they 
are the same people as the management they are supposed to be monitoring.”). 
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to the terms of an LLC agreement. Naturally, where owners get to 
select the managers, the managers will do the owners’ bidding—which 
may or may not involve creating public benefit.286 In that context, it is 
again absurd to expect the owners to bring a benefit enforcement 
proceeding against the managers they have selected (and have the 
power to remove) in order to enforce the business’s statutory 
commitments.287 
Even where there is a dissenting owner, as might be the case in a 
publicly traded benefit entity, it is doubtful that the owner would ever 
succeed in a benefit enforcement proceeding. First, a benefit 
enforcement proceeding brought against the entity’s managers is 
considered a derivative, rather than direct, lawsuit.288 As such, the 
lawsuit will be subject to various procedural barriers associated with 
all derivative actions, including the obligation to first make a demand 
on the entity’s managers or otherwise demonstrate the futility of such 
a demand.289 
Second, assuming the dissenting owner’s claims can survive these 
procedural barriers, as already noted, the statutory standards of what 
qualifies as a “public benefit” and the conduct required of managers 
are so vague as to be meaningless and, therefore, not susceptible to 
judicial enforcement.290 Rather than second-guess the judgment of an 
entity’s managers as to how to create public benefit, courts are likely 
to defer to the managers’ judgment,291 applying the business judgment 
 
 286. See Callison, Benefit Corporations, supra note 52, at 153 (“[S]hareholders hire and 
fire directors, and it is likely that when private shareholder benefit and broader public 
benefit collide, many directors will ‘follow the money’ and align with shareholder 
interests.”); Strine, Corporate Power Is Corporate Purpose I, supra note 197, at 179 
(“[W]hen a conflict emerges between the interests of corporate constituencies without 
power within the corporate polity—which is all of them other than stockholders—and the 
one with power—the stockholders—those elected by the stockholders bend to the will of 
their citizenry [i.e., the stockholders].”). 
 287. See Dorff, Assessing the Assessment, supra note 21, at 517 (“In closely held 
companies, none [of those who have standing to bring a benefit enforcement proceeding] 
are likely to have an incentive to enforce the company’s social mission with a lawsuit, 
barring unusual circumstances.”). 
 288. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §	367 (2016) (governing Delaware benefit 
corporations); id. tit. 6, §	18-1206 (Supp. 2018) (governing Delaware benefit LLCs); 
MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. §	305(c)(2) (2017), https://benefitcorp.net/sites/default/
files/Model%20benefit%20corp%20legislation%20_4_17_17.pdf [https://perma.cc/W55T-
SPDS]. 
 289. See Loewenstein, Benefit Corporation Law, supra note 19, at 387–88. 
 290. See supra Section III.A.1. 
 291. See CLARK ET AL., supra note 3, at 28 (“If the corporation could show a 
meaningful good faith effort to pursue such positive impacts, then a judge would likely be 
reticent to interpose his or her judgment for the corporation’s.”); Murray, Social 
Enterprise Innovation, supra note 4, at 365–66 (“Without clarity on priority or weight of 
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rule or a “purpose judgment rule” variant,292 in the absence of 
evidence suggesting a conflict of interest or subjective bad faith.293 
Finally, even if the dissenting owner can convince a court that the 
entity’s managers failed to meet their ill-defined statutory 
commitments, the best a prevailing owner can hope for is some form 
of nonmonetary remedy, because money damages are statutorily 
prohibited.294 
Given these many limitations, it is improbable that a dissenting 
owner would ever elect to bring a benefit enforcement proceeding.295 
Indeed, after nearly a decade since the first benefit corporation 
statute, there are no reported cases involving a benefit enforcement 
 
the factors that [benefit corporation] directors must balance, significant accountability 
imposed by the courts becomes highly unlikely.”); Reiser, supra note 43, at 612 (“[Benefit 
corporation statutes] impose no clear framework for directorial decision making. Without 
one, it is difficult to identify a metric by which shareholders might enforce fiduciaries’ 
compliance with dual mission.”); Yockey, supra note 111, at 797 (“Even if shareholders 
litigate issues bearing on a benefit corporation’s social pursuits, courts confronting this 
new and unique space will likely resist substituting their judgment for that of management 
so long as managers appear to be making a good faith effort.”). 
 292. See Murray, Choose Your Own Master, supra note 2, at 41–42. 
 293. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §	365(b) (2016) (providing that a director’s statutory 
obligation to “balance” the interests of owners with those of nonowners “will be deemed 
.	.	. satisf[ied] .	.	. if [her] decision is both informed and disinterested and not such that no 
person of ordinary, sound judgment would approve”); MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. 
§	301(e) (2017), https://benefitcorp.net/sites/default/files/Model%20benefit%20corp%20
legislation%20_4_17_17.pdf [https://perma.cc/W55T-SPDS] (providing that a director’s 
statutory obligation to “consider” the interests of various constituencies is fulfilled if the 
director is disinterested, informed, and “rationally believes that the business judgment is in 
the best interests of the benefit corporation”). 
 294. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §	18-1204(a) (Supp. 2018) (governing Delaware 
benefit LLCs); MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. §§	301(c), 305(b) (2017), 
https://benefitcorp.net/sites/default/files/Model%20benefit%20corp%20legislation%20_
4_17_17.pdf [https://perma.cc/W55T-SPDS] Delaware’s benefit corporation statute 
contemplates money damages but allows a corporation’s charter to exculpate those 
damages. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §	365(c) (2016). In practice, such exculpation clauses are 
standard. See J. Robert Brown, Jr. & Sandeep Gopalan, Opting Only In: Contractarians, 
Waiver of Liability Provision, and the Race to the Bottom, 42 IND. L. REV. 285, 285 (2009) 
(finding that all but one corporation in the Fortune 100 have exculpation provisions); J. 
Travis Laster, Revlon Is A Standard of Review: Why It’s True and What It Means, 19 
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 5, 52 (2013) (describing “corporations without exculpatory 
provisions in their charters” as “rare”). 
 295. See Loewenstein, Benefit Corporation Law, supra note 19, at 388 (concluding, in 
light of the many limitations to a benefit enforcement proceeding, “there is little incentive 
to bring such a claim”); Murray, Social Enterprise Innovation, supra note 4, at 362 (“With 
monetary damages unavailable, plaintiffs and their attorneys have less incentive to bring 
benefit enforcement proceedings [and] directors have less reason to fear the proceedings 
.	.	.	.”). 
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proceeding.296 And there is no reason to believe such proceedings will 
be brought any more frequently in the analogous context of benefit 
LLCs. All of this has led one typically measured business law scholar 
to conclude the benefit enforcement proceeding is “an ephemeral 
remedy [and] at best[] an illusion”297—one that masks the true 
unenforceability of the statutory commitments made by businesses 
embracing the state-sponsored “benefit” designation. 
3.  Feckless Reporting Mandate 
The statutorily mandated benefit report does little to address the 
lack of accountability. In theory, the benefit report provides 
transparency and, thus, a measure of accountability by allowing the 
public to decide for itself whether a self-proclaimed benefit entity is 
living up to its public benefit commitment.298  In practice, however, 
benefit reports merely provide businesses with an opportunity to 
engage in self-congratulatory propagandizing.299 
Although a business’s benefit report must provide a narrative 
description of the ways the business pursued and created public 
benefit and any hindrances the business faced in doing so,300 this 
overly vague statutory mandate gives a benefit entity “an extreme 
amount of freedom in deciding what to report” and what to omit.301 
Moreover, a benefit report is not required to be audited or certified 
by a third party,302 and there is no express penalty against a benefit 
 
 296. Loewenstein, Benefit Corporation Law, supra note 19, at 388; Murray, Social 
Enterprise Innovation, supra note 4, at 366 n.117. 
 297. Loewenstein, Benefit Corporation Law, supra note 19, at 388–89; accord Yockey, 
supra note 111, at 797 (concluding that “the benefit enforcement proceeding is fairly 
toothless”). 
 298. Of course, even this theory is highly dubious because it relies on the “fanciful” 
assumption that consumers will take the time to retrieve, review, and then intelligently 
assess such reports. See Loewenstein, Benefit Corporation Law, supra note 19, at 386–87. 
 299. See Ball, supra note 4, at 968 (“[T]he benefit report is characterized as a 
marketing and branding tool for social enterprises not a corporate governance 
mechanism.”); Murray, Social Enterprise Innovation, supra note 4, at 360 (“Many of the 
few annual [benefit] reports that are currently available are self-promotional and do not 
provide much value to a reader looking for a full, fair evaluation of the business.”). 
 300. See MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. §	401(a)(1) (2017), https://benefitcorp.net/sites/
default/files/Model%20benefit%20corp%20legislation%20_4_17_17.pdf [https://perma.cc/
W55T-SPDS]. 
 301. Murray, An Early Report on Benefit Reports, supra note 39, at 46; accord Murray, 
Social Enterprise Innovation, supra note 4, at 359–60. 
 302. See MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. §	401(c) (2017), https://benefitcorp.net/sites/
default/files/Model%20benefit%20corp%20legislation%20_4_17_17.pdf [https://perma.cc/
W55T-SPDS]. 
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entity for false or misleading reporting.303 Under this feckless 
framework, because a benefit entity, its managers, and owners all 
have a financial and reputational interest in portraying the business 
most positively, benefit reports are destined to be nothing more than 
self-promoting puffery.304 
To temper the potential for such abuse, the MBCL also requires 
a business embracing the “benefit” brand to include in its benefit 
report an assessment of its overall social and environmental 
performance against a “third-party standard.”305 As already noted, B 
Lab’s proprietary B Impact Assessment qualifies as a “third-party 
standard,” but that only raises questions about B Lab’s apparent self-
interest in promoting benefit entity legislation.306 To the extent 
benefit entity legislation channels socially minded businesses to 
measure themselves against B Lab’s standards, such legislation only 
 
 303. See Ball, supra note 4, at 963; Dorff, Assessing the Assessment, supra note 21, at 
539–40; Murray, Social Enterprise Innovation, supra note 4, at 359. State fraud laws may 
provide a safeguard against false or misleading assessments, but a plaintiff claiming fraud 
would need to show scienter and harm caused by the fraud. See Dorff, Assessing the 
Assessment, supra note 21, at 539–40. 
 304. See Murray, Social Enterprise Innovation, supra note 4, at 359 (noting that the 
“vague” statutory requirements for a benefit report under the MBCL “allow[] for 
significant puffery”); see also Callison, Putting New Sheets on a Procrustean Bed, supra 
note 260, at 111 (concluding the MBCL permits a business to produce a benefit report that 
is “sketchy, forward-looking, vague, non-analytical or fabricated, and no one will know the 
difference”); Yockey, supra note 111, at 796 (noting that the MBCL enables “firms with 
negative or hard-to-express information [to] simply withhold disclosure or release only 
partial information”). 
 305. See MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. §	401(a)(2) (2017), https://benefitcorp.net/sites/
default/files/Model%20benefit%20corp%20legislation%20_4_17_17.pdf [https://perma.cc/
W55T-SPDS]. 
 306. See Loewenstein, Benefit Corporation Law, supra note 19, at 386 (“[I]nasmuch B 
Lab meets the statutory requirement of providing a third-party standard, [it] smacks of 
self-interest.”); id. at 391 n.42 (observing, based on the author’s personal experience, that 
B Lab opposes benefit corporation legislation that does not require an annual assessment 
based on a third-party standard); see also Heminway, What Am I Missing, supra note 193 
(“B Lab, which supports or is behind the benefit corporation legislative proposals .	.	. is 
essentially the only [third-party standard] that meets the statutory standards. This smells 
of conflicting interests .	.	.	.”); Murray, Social Enterprise Innovation, supra note 4, at 352 
n.41 (“B Lab serves as both a driving force behind the lobbying efforts and a provider of 
the dominant third-party standard. This dual role seems to suggest a conflict of interest 
.	.	.	.”); Yockey, supra note 111, at 798 (“A cynic might note that B Lab [who lobbied for 
the Model Act] also happens to be in a position to gain reputational benefits by providing 
firms with the assessment standards that the Model Act requires.”). As already noted, 
although B Lab provides benefit corporations complimentary access to B Lab’s B Impact 
Assessment tool, B Lab offers businesses that earn a qualifying score on its proprietary 
assessment the opportunity to be certified as a “B Corporation” for a fee. See supra note 
49 and accompanying text. 
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empowers and aggrandizes the reach of one private nonprofit to 
impose onto others its idiosyncratic vision of public good.307 
To be sure, as an alternative to B Lab’s standards, a benefit 
entity is free to select another set of third-party standards, so long as 
those standards meet the statutory definition set forth in the MBCL. 
But the MBCL defines “third-party standard” in only general 
terms,308 leaving private standard-setters largely unregulated and free 
to prescribe their own conception of what constitutes public benefit.309 
The only statutory restrictions are that the standard-setter is 
independent of the benefit entity and that its standards are 
comprehensive, transparent, and credible.310 As observed by one 
scholar, “[i]f a standard-setter clearly and transparently sets low 
standards, it may qualify [as a ‘third-party standard’ under the 
MBCL] .	.	. just as a standard setter with higher standards, leaving the 
door open to greenwashing or even fraud.”311 
Of course, benefit entities may have little need to shop for a 
particularly lenient third-party standard, because the MBCL does not 
statutorily require a business to obtain any particular level of 
achievement against those standards in order to retain its state-
bestowed “benefit” status.312 Whatever third-party standard a benefit 
entity chooses, the business and its managers, and not the third-party 
standard-setter, get to assess the business’s performance against those 
 
 307. See Dorff, Why Public Benefit Corporations?, supra note 13, at 111 (observing that 
one disadvantage of B Lab’s dominance as a third-party standard-setter is “that by 
imposing a particular vision of how companies should behave, it impedes entrepreneurs 
from experimenting with a variety of different approaches”); see also Callison, Putting 
New Sheets on a Procrustean Bed, supra note 260, at 98 (criticizing this aspect of the 
[MBCL] as “illiberal and conformity-inducing”). 
 308. See MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. §	102 (2017), https://benefitcorp.net/sites/
default/files/Model%20benefit%20corp%20legislation%20_4_17_17.pdf [https://perma.cc/
-SPDS] (defining “third-party standard”). 
 309. See Murray, An Early Report on Benefit Reports, supra note 39, at 46 (“There is 
.	.	. little to no oversight or assurance of quality with regards to the third-party 
standards.”); Reiser, supra note 43, at 611 (observing that standard-setters are left 
“unregulated .	.	. bounded by neither standards nor oversight”). 
 310. See §	102 (defining “third-party standard”). 
 311. Reiser, supra note 43, at 611; see also id. at 617 (“[T]he delegation to third-party 
standard-setters to vet .	.	. public benefit and the lack of a statutory floor for what counts 
as public benefit make low standards and greenwashing particular concerns for the benefit 
corporation.”); Murray, Social Enterprise Innovation, supra note 4, at 361–62 (“A benefit 
corporation that does not see the value in using a third-party standard may choose to use 
the weakest standard available, provide little to no useful information to the market, and 
waste company resources in the process. Under the [MBCL], this sort of activity by 
opportunistic benefit corporations would be difficult to punish .	.	.	.”). 
 312. See Dorff, Assessing the Assessment, supra note 21, at 551. 
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standards.313 The third-party standard-setter has no say in that 
assessment, the business need not provide any supporting 
documentation,314 and, as already noted, there is no express penalty 
for false or misleading reporting.315 
Add to these concerns the fact that under the MBCL there is no 
apparent enforcement mechanism to ensure a “benefit” business even 
prepares and publishes the statutorily required benefit report.316 
Although the MBCL requires a benefit entity to file its benefit report 
with the state in which it is organized,317 the legislation provides for no 
consequences if a business fails to do so.318 Perhaps the owners of a 
benefit entity can bring a benefit enforcement proceeding to compel 
the noncomplying business to perform its reporting obligation,319 but, 
as already noted, there are numerous reasons to be skeptical that the 
owners would ever elect to do so.320 What is clear is that neither 
members of the public nor any governmental authority—those who 
otherwise have no way to confirm a self-proclaimed benefit entity is 
deserving of its state-sanctioned “benefit” label—have standing to 
compel a business to actually prepare and publish a benefit report.321 
Given the fecklessness of the MBCL legal framework, it is 
unsurprising that an empirical study showed compliance with the 
statutory benefit reporting mandate is “abysmal,” at less than ten 
 
 313. See id. at 551–52. 
 314. See id. 
 315. See supra note 303 and accompanying text. 
 316. See Ball, supra note 4, at 963; Murray, Social Enterprise Innovation, supra note 4, 
at 359. 
 317. See MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. §	402(d) (2017), https://benefitcorp.net/sites/
default/files/Model%20benefit%20corp%20legislation%20_4_17_17.pdf [https://perma.cc/
W55T-SPDS]. Although the MBCL requires a benefit corporation’s annual benefit report 
to be filed with the state, most of the states that have adopted the MBCL have omitted 
this particular provision in their state statutes. See Murray, An Early Report on Benefit 
Reports, supra note 39, at 31–32, 47. 
 318. The MBCL includes no express penalty for a benefit corporation’s failure to file 
its annual benefit report with the state, and most state benefit corporation statutes have 
followed MBCL in this regard. See §	402(d). 
 319. The MBCL does not expressly provide that a benefit enforcement proceeding 
may be brought to compel the production of a benefit report. See id. §	305(a). But 
presumably a shareholder may bring such a proceeding by alleging that the failure to 
produce a benefit report is a “violation of [a statutory] obligation,” which is an 
appropriate ground for such a proceeding. See id.; Murray, An Early Report on Benefit 
Reports, supra note 39, at 44. 
 320. See supra Section III.A.2. 
 321. See MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. §	305(c) (2017), https://benefitcorp.net/sites/
default/files/Model%20benefit%20corp%20legislation%20_4_17_17.pdf [https://perma.cc/
W55T-SPDS] (identifying the parties who have standing to bring a benefit enforcement 
proceeding). 
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percent in the sample surveyed.322 Of the very few businesses that did 
produce a benefit report, the study showed that the contents of a 
majority of reports failed to comply with the statutory requirements 
of the MBCL.323 To take a particularly risible example from the study, 
the benefit report of one company identified, without elaboration, an 
otherwise obscure individual, “John Franco,” as its third-party 
standard.324 Who is John Franco? What are his standards? And do 
those standards meet the letter or spirit of the MBCL? It is 
impossible to tell because, under the MBCL, neither the public nor 
any governmental authority has the means to answer any of these 
questions.325 In all, the study’s findings seem to only confirm that the 
nominally required benefit report is, in fact, optional and offers no 
accountability.326 
Perhaps in recognition of the many flaws in the MBCL, 
Delaware’s benefit entity statutes abandon much of the pretense 
surrounding benefit reports. Under Delaware statutes, the benefit 
report need not include an assessment against a third-party standard 
and need not be made publicly available to constituencies other than 
the business’s owners.327 In effect, Delaware’s statutes seem to 
concede that self-proclaimed benefit entities are, like conventional 
corporations and LLCs, accountable only to their owners and no one 
else. 
B. Costs of Benefit Entity Statutes 
By creating a state-sanctioned “benefit” designation and making 
it available to private, for-profit enterprises without accountability, 
benefit entity statutes invite misuse and exploitation.328 Absent-
minded entrepreneurs may, with the best of intentions, embrace the 
“benefit” mantle but abjectly fail to comply with the statute’s letter or 
spirit. Worse yet, outright charlatans may cynically flaunt the state-
 
 322. See Murray, An Early Report on Benefit Reports, supra note 39, at 26. 
 323. See id. at 56–57 (depicting in tabular format the statutorily required elements 
missing from the benefit reports surveyed). 
 324. See id. at 46. 
 325. See id. at 47 n.116. 
 326. See id. at 44 (identifying the “[l]ack of effective statutory enforcement 
mechanisms” as one explanation for “widespread benefit report noncompliance”). 
 327. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §	366(a) (2016) (governing benefit corporations); id. 
tit. 6, §	18-1205 (Supp. 2018) (governing benefit LLCs). 
 328. See Callison, Putting New Sheets on a Procrustean Bed, supra note 260, at 109 
(“To the extent a ‘benefit corporation’ election is intended to confer special branding 
status in the marketplace, the unregulated nature of the election, and the possibility of 
greenwashing for-profit activities under the benefit corporation label, is a significant 
problem.”). 
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endorsed “benefit” designation to lure gullible, uninformed 
customers, investors, or employees. In either case, because benefit 
entity statutes offer no accountability to the public, there will be no 
consequences for well-meaning entrepreneurs or mendacious 
hucksters using the “benefit” moniker to gain an unfair advantage 
over businesses organized as conventional corporations and LLCs.329 
This risk of misuse and exploitation should be enough to counsel 
against benefit entity statutes—especially when conventional 
corporate and LLC statutes already enable social enterprises to 
pursue a social mission alongside profits. But even if this risk does not 
materialize—even if statutory benefit corporations and LLCs do 
largely live up to their “benefit” aspiration—benefit entity statutes 
impose their own costs, adding needless complexity to an already 
complex legal system and exacerbating misimpressions about 
conventional for-profit businesses. 
1.  Needless Complexity 
Business law is already awash in a bewildering array of statutory 
business forms. There are corporations, LLCs, and partnerships of all 
types, including general partnerships, limited partnerships, limited 
liability partnerships, and limited liability limited partnerships.330 
Within some forms, there are subforms. For example, LLCs may be 
member managed or manager managed, and corporations may, for 
tax purposes, elect between S-corporations versus C-corporations. 
Some states have also authorized other types of statutory business 
forms to accommodate social enterprises in addition to or in lieu of 
benefit corporations and LLCs.331 Thus, even before the advent of 
benefit corporations and LLCs, it was easy for anyone without 
specialized legal training to be overwhelmed by the number of 
choices and distinctions between each. 
Enacting benefit corporation and, now, benefit LLC legislation 
creates even more statutory business entities to reckon with. The 
 
 329. Cf. Murray, Choose Your Own Master, supra note 2, at 44 (observing that “[t]he 
benefits of a social enterprise brand have potential to be significant”). 
 330. In addition to these familiar entities, there are others, like nonprofit corporations 
and statutory trusts. See generally Brewer, supra note 228, at 691–708 (discussing nonprofit 
corporations as social enterprises); Robert H. Sitkoff, Trust As “Uncorporation”: A 
Research Agenda, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 31 (discussing statutory business trusts generally). 
 331. See Murray, The Social Enterprise Law Market, supra note 9, at 543–55 
(identifying various types of newly enacted statutory business associations catering to 
social enterprises). 
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costs of this added complexity will be borne by many.332 Law students, 
for example, will be forced to spend time understanding these new 
business forms. In a standard three- or four-credit law school course 
on business associations, only so much time may be devoted to each 
type of statutory business entity. Covering benefit corporations and 
LLCs will necessarily come at the expense of existing statutory forms, 
which already enable what benefit entity legislation purports to. Less 
versed in conventional corporations and LLCs, graduating law 
students will be less prepared for legal practice. 
Already out of law school, legal practitioners will likewise need 
to devote unbillable time educating themselves to understand these 
new statutory business entities in order to competently advise their 
clients, as is their professional responsibility.333 Their clients, too, will 
suffer from the added complexity. Entrepreneurs launching a new 
business already face a dizzying set of options, and the benefit 
corporation and LLC only further complicate the process of selecting 
an appropriate statutory entity.334 
Like new businesses, the owners of existing businesses will also 
be forced to reassess their current legal structure and consider 
whether it makes sense to reorganize as a benefit entity.335 The need 
to reassess will become particularly acute if competitors embrace the 
state-sponsored “benefit” mantle and, thereby, gain an edge in the 
market for customers, investment dollars, and employees. In such 
cases, owners of existing businesses may feel compelled to reorganize 
as a benefit entity, not to pursue social good per se but instead to 
simply rebalance the competitive playing field made uneven by 
benefit entity legislation. 
For both new businesses and established ventures alike, the task 
of understanding these new statutory business forms, and their 
differences from other, more established forms of statutory business 
associations, will likely require the aid of legal counsel, which is 
typically expensive. Thus, for all businesses—whether or not they 
avail themselves of benefit entity legislation—grappling with these 
new statutory business forms will increase costs, while achieving 
nothing in terms of legal capability. 
 
 332. See Loewenstein, Benefit Corporations: A Challenge, supra note 19, at 1035 (“The 
proliferation of business organizations is confusing to the public and the bar.”). 
 333. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016). 
 334. See Tu, supra note 21, at 172. 
 335. See id. 
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2.  Fostering Misperceptions 
Unfortunately, the task of understanding benefit entities—and 
their purpose and function within the broader landscape of statutory 
business associations—is made no simpler by the convoluted rationale 
given for their existence. On one hand, B Lab and other advocates 
have asserted that the new statutory business form offers an antidote 
to conventional corporate law’s restrictive mandate of shareholder 
primacy. And it is easy to have this impression of conventional 
corporate law reading the excerpts from Dodge, Revlon, and eBay out 
of context.336 
It is harder to understand these precedents in the larger legal 
framework that governs corporations and other statutory business 
associations. It takes prolix law review articles, like this one, to 
explain that conventional corporate and LLC law does not inexorably 
compel a business or its managers to mercilessly pursue profits at the 
expense of other considerations. As this Article has demonstrated, 
nothing in conventional corporate or, especially, LLC law precludes a 
social entrepreneur from forming and operating a business that is 
committed to balancing profits against a public mission. Indeed, as 
already noted, there are several examples of prominent businesses 
organized as conventional corporations or LLCs that do so 
successfully.337 
But when legislatures enact statutes that explicitly authorize 
certain businesses to advance public benefit, it naturally leads to the 
negative inference that existing law somehow prohibits conventional 
corporations and LLCs from doing the same.338 Benefit entity statutes 
 
 336. Cf. Khatib, supra note 259, at 174 (“The theory that the benefit corporation 
emerged as a result of legal necessity is misleading. .	.	. [A]dvocates of the benefit 
corporation have preyed on the fears of social entrepreneurs to help solidify the new 
corporate form.”). 
 337. See supra notes 110–11 and accompanying text. 
 338. See, e.g., Callison, Benefit Corporations, supra note 52, at 153 (warning that the 
existence of statutory benefit corporations implicitly suggests “all other corporations that 
do not elect benefit corporation status and impliedly must act only in ways that relate to 
shareholder profit maximization”); Callison, Putting New Sheets on A Procrustean Bed, 
supra note 260, at 104–05 (warning that statutory benefit corporations create a “legislative 
inference that corporations that are not benefit corporations can act only in ways that 
maximize shareholder profit”); Joshua P. Fershee, supra note 138, at 362–63 (“Now that 
many states have alternative social enterprise entity structures, there is an increased risk 
that traditional entities will be viewed (by both courts and directors) as pure profit 
vehicles, eliminating directors’ ability to make choices with the public benefit in mind 
.	.	.	.”); Manesh, Nearing 30, supra note 198, at 144 (“The very existence of an alternative 
legal regime rejecting the primacy of shareholders may serve as a counterpoint for 
corporate law, ossifying the already pervasive norm within traditional, for-profit 
corporations that boards must mercilessly pursue shareholder wealth maximization under 
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thus perpetuate the misperception that conventional corporations and 
LLCs are legally compelled to seek profits solely for the benefit of 
their owners339—that such businesses cannot, do not, or should not 
seek to benefit the public.340 
Fomenting this misperception will have pernicious consequences. 
The managers and owners of businesses organized as conventional 
corporations or LLCs (not to mention the lawyers who advise them), 
may interpret the advent of statutory benefit entities to mean that 
conventional businesses are somehow legally precluded from 
pursuing initiatives that might advance social welfare at the expense 
of profits.341 Worse yet, to the extent law shapes normative 
 
all circumstances.”); Tu, supra note 21, at 174 (“[T]he existence of Benefit Corporation 
statutes may have the unintended consequence of being construed as a legislative mandate 
that, under corporate law, considering broader stakeholder interest and creating a public 
benefit is wholly prohibited unless a business has opted to organize or reincorporate as a 
Benefit Corporation.”). 
 339. See, e.g., Callison, Putting New Sheets on a Procrustean Bed, supra note 260, at 88 
(“Even if the legal effect of the shareholder profit-maximization norm might be 
overstated, the widely-held perception that corporations exist to maximize shareholder 
profit can operate on a prophylactic level to discourage directors from considering non-
shareholder interests when making significant corporate decisions.”); Fershee, supra note 
138, at 363 (“There is an increasing sense, with the general public and in the courts, that 
anything else a [conventional] business does must be secondary to, and must not at all 
interfere with, profit seeking.”); Reiser, supra note 43, at 609 (“Whatever the correct 
answer is on the state of the law, fiduciaries rightly or wrongly are often wedded to the 
idea that in a for-profit entity their foremost goal should be maximizing the entity’s value 
to its owners.”). 
 340. The MBCL attempts to mitigate this misperception by stipulating that the statute 
“shall not of itself create an implication that a contrary or different rule of law is 
applicable to a business corporation that is not a benefit corporation.” See MODEL 
BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. §	101(b) (2017), https://benefitcorp.net/sites/default/files/
Model%20benefit%20corp%20legislation%20_4_17_17.pdf [https://perma.cc/W55T-SPDS]. 
But this provision “does not change the existential question of whether a legislature’s 
adoption of a benefit corporation statute entails recognition of the profit maximization 
norm as a starting place for all corporations.” Callison, Putting New Sheets on a 
Procrustean Bed, supra note 260, at 105 n.83. 
 341. See, e.g., Blount & Offei-Danso, supra note 43, at 659 (“The development of 
entities like the benefit corporation creates the perception in the minds of entrepreneurs 
that they cannot carry out a social mission through a traditional business corporation.”); 
Callison, Putting New Sheets on a Procrustean Bed, supra note 260, at 105 (warning that 
benefit corporation statutes “perpetuate[] the misconception that current corporate law 
requires directors to focus solely on immediate profit and share price maximization”); Tu, 
supra note 21, at 173 (“Even though [conventional] corporate law is flexible enough to 
accommodate the pursuit of both profit and public benefit, the public, corporate managers 
[and] shareholders .	.	. may construe Benefit Corporations as the only proper (or at least 
lowest risk) legal entity for pursuing a hybrid corporate purpose.”). 
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opinions,342 owners and managers of conventional businesses may 
come to believe that they in fact have no social responsibility, that the 
sole purpose of their business is to maximize profits, and that the 
promotion of social welfare is instead the province of benefit 
businesses, philanthropies, or the public sector.343 
Customers, investors, and society more broadly may become 
similarly deluded. Believing that conventional businesses are legally 
compelled to maximize profits, society will expect less of conventional 
businesses and excuse their socially or environmentally irresponsible 
misdeeds.344 
 
 342. See Robson, supra note 272, at 503 (“Law can cause the behavior of market 
participants to coalesce around a particular strategy and provide affirmation that other 
participants are acting in a similar manner.”). 
 343. See, e.g., Justin Blount & Patricia Nunley, What Is A “Social” Business and Why 
Does the Answer Matter?, 8 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 278, 312 (2014) (“The 
creation of [benefit corporations] tacitly gives credence to the widely held but inaccurate 
view that standard, for-profit corporations can legally justify misconduct or unethical 
decision-making as the relentless pursuit of profits required by corporate law.”); Lyman 
Johnson, Pluralism in Corporate Form: Corporate Law and Benefit Corps., 25 REGENT U. 
L. REV. 269, 295 (2013) (“[T]o the extent Benefit Corps. represent a segmenting of the 
market, some traditional firms might be glad to abandon at least some of their social 
responsibility initiatives .	.	. on the rationale that now those ‘are for Benefit Corps. to 
do.’”); Robson, supra note 272, at 552–53 (“[T]he creation of a specialized entity, with a 
statutorily defined purpose of creating a general public benefit .	.	. undermines the notion 
.	.	. that the obligation to consider the interests of stakeholders should be an integral part 
of all business entities.” (emphasis omitted) (footnotes omitted)); Tu, supra note 21, at 177 
(“[T]he existence of Benefit Corporations statutes could also be used to justify the lack of 
social initiatives by traditional for-profit corporations. .	.	. For-profit corporations facing 
pressure for their lack of social initiatives could point to Benefit Corporation statutes as a 
justification for their laser focus on profit maximization .	.	.	.”). 
 344. As others have observed, 
[The Model Benefit Corporation Legislation] .	.	. create[s] the perception in the 
minds of consumers, investors, and society as a whole that they should not expect 
much from typical corporations or should excuse their poor behavior as legally 
required under the shareholder wealth maximization norm—when it is in fact 
not—and that only these specially designated entities can or should be expected to 
pursue any social goals. 
See Blount & Offei-Danso, supra note 43, at 659; see also Callison, Putting New Sheets on a 
Procrustean Bed, supra note 260, at 105 (“[T]he benefit corporation movement arguably 
harms the broader interests of 21st century corporate governance by creating a bipolar 
world of regular corporations that maximize private profits and other corporations that 
consider social and environmental sustainability and other public goods.”); Jessica Chu, 
Note, Filling a Nonexistent Gap: Benefit Corporations and the Myth of Shareholder Wealth 
Maximization, 22 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 155, 186–87 (2012) (“[B]enefit corporations 
further reinforce the assumption that corporations exist only to make money for their 
shareholders. .	.	. Their creation establishes a legal dichotomy that only strengthens the 
shareholder primacy norm and furthers the unwarranted belief that ‘regular’ corporations 
are unable to do social good.”). 
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Finally, courts, too, might arrive at the same conclusions.345 
Historically, courts have wisely avoided second-guessing decisions 
made by business managers to advance social welfare at the expense 
of profits.346 Applying the business judgment rule, courts have instead 
deferred to the managers of a given company on the complex 
question of what is in the best interest of that company.347 But the 
advent of benefit entities might naturally lead courts to make the 
negative inference that conventional corporations and LLCs may not 
sacrifice profits for public benefit.348 Judicial movement in this 
direction would erode the protection of the business judgment rule349 
and create a strong disincentive for business managers to undertake 
prosocial initiatives, lest they be subsequently enjoined or, worse yet, 
face personal liability in a shareholder lawsuit alleging breach of 
fiduciary duty.350 
Whatever the case—whether it is owners, managers, judges, or 
society more broadly that conclude that conventional corporations 
and LLCs may not pursue public benefit at the expense of profits—
the result will be the same: businesses organized as conventional 
 
 345. See Fershee, supra note 138, at 384 (“With the addition of social benefit entities, 
courts are even more likely to question the business purpose of traditional entities.”); 
Yosifon, Opting Out of Shareholder Primacy, supra note 166, at 483 (“It is quite possible 
that Chancery would now say that the implied public policy of [Delaware corporate law] is 
that deviation from shareholder primacy has to be done in the way prescribed by the 
[benefit corporation provisions], or not at all.”). 
 346. See supra notes 129–38 and accompanying text. 
 347. As explained by the Delaware Supreme Court, 
[A] core rationale of the business judgment rule .	.	. is that judges are poorly 
positioned to evaluate the wisdom of business decisions and there is little utility to 
having them second-guess the determination of impartial decision-makers with 
more information (in the case of directors) or an actual economic stake in the 
outcome (in the case of informed, disinterested stockholders). 
Corwin v. KKR Fin. Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304, 313–14 (Del. 2015); see also Bernard S. 
Sharfman, The Importance of the Business Judgment Rule, 14 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 27, 46 
(2017) (rationalizing the business judgment rule on the basis that “[j]udges need to respect 
Board decision-making for the simple reason that they are inferior to the Board in terms 
of determining what is the best corporate decision”). 
 348. See Fershee, supra note 138, at 386. 
 349. See id. at 384–87. 
 350. See Callison, Benefit Corporations, supra note 52, at 153 (“For non-electing 
corporations, the existence of the benefit corporation alternative may weaken the 
promotion of socially responsible decision-making by corporate boards, the directors of 
which do not want to be brought into litigation or test the protections of the business 
judgment rule.”); Tu, supra note 21, at 174–77 (warning that “[m]anagers of a traditional 
for-profit corporation might decide to reduce or eliminate broader social endeavors to 
mitigate the risk of an increasingly unpredictable legal environment [created by benefit 
corporation statutes]”). 
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corporations or LLCs will retreat from socially minded programs and 
initiatives, and society will suffer a net decrease in public benefit 
arising from private enterprises.351 This is an ironic result for a 
legislative movement that is ostensibly intended to harness the power 
of for-profit businesses to advance social welfare.  
C. Availability of Private Branding 
Given the risk that benefit entity statutes may be readily 
exploited to mislead the public and compete unfairly with 
conventional corporations and LLCs, and the attendant costs such 
statutes create by adding needless complexity and stoking 
misperceptions about conventional corporations and LLCs, it is hard 
to justify the enactment of such statutes—especially where, as has 
been demonstrated, from a legal perspective such statutes accomplish 
nothing. 
But the case against benefit entity statutes is even stronger. If the 
purpose of benefit entity legislation is to facilitate an easily 
recognizable brand for socially minded businesses to distinguish 
themselves in the market, then there already exists an obvious 
alternative to state-enacted legislation. Private certifications, like B 
Lab’s very own B Corporation certification, achieve the same 
signaling function and do so more effectively than benefit entity 
statutes.352 In contrast to the statutory “benefit” moniker, which can 
 
 351. See Callison, Putting New Sheets on a Procrustean Bed, supra note 260, at 105 
(warning that by “perpetuat[ing] the misconception that current corporate law requires 
directors to focus solely on .	.	. share price maximization,” benefit corporation statutes will 
“undermine[] the promotion of socially responsible decision-making by corporate 
boards”); Robson, supra note 272, at 552–53 (warning that the advent of benefit 
corporations might lead socially conscious conventional businesses to “do less, 
constraining what has been a steady, if unspectacular, acknowledgment of social 
responsibility by traditional for-profits”); Tu, supra note 21, at 174 (warning that “added 
complexity and reinforcement of the profit maximization norm [created by benefit 
corporation statutes] may collectively lead to an overall reduction in the advancement of 
social missions by [conventional] corporations”). 
 352. See Blount & Nunley, supra note 343, at 311 (“[T]here is no added transparency 
or branding benefit to consumers or investors created by [benefit corporations] that 
cannot be gained by any other [conventional entity] through simply engaging in annual 
social responsibility reporting audited by an established third party.”); Molk, supra note 
109, at 249 (“Clearly .	.	.	, there is potential for certification systems to work without the 
existence of organizational forms designed specifically for social enterprise.”); Murray, 
Beneficial Benefit LLCs?, supra note 7, at 448 (“[M]uch of the signaling benefit [that 
comes from organizing as a benefit entity] can be achieved through mere B certification 
from B Lab, while the legal issues can be dealt with in traditional LLC operating-
agreement language.”); Murray, Choose Your Own Master, supra note 2, at 45 (“A flexible 
corporate code, coupled with a meaningful private brand (such as, perhaps, B Lab’s B 
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be claimed by any business without accountability for that claim, a 
private certification will typically entail some degree of verification or 
auditing by the certifying organization.353 For example, B Corporation 
certification requires a business to not only earn a qualifying score on 
B Lab’s proprietary B Impact Assessment but also to provide B Lab 
confirming documentation and to submit to a site visit.354 In this 
respect, a private certification like B Corporation sends a more 
credible signal about a business’s public benefit than the business’s 
own, self-serving claims.355 
 Indeed, a cynic might surmise that B Lab’s advocacy for benefit 
corporation legislation has been motivated, at least in part, by its 
desire to channel more businesses to its proprietary B Corporation 
certification.356 Although B Lab is a nonprofit, the more businesses 
ascribe to its certification system, the greater influence B Lab and its 
principals enjoy to dictate their own particular vision of social good 
onto others. But if the aim, or even the effect, of benefit entity 
legislation is to channel more businesses to the private certification of 
a Philadelphia-based nonprofit, then that is surely not an appropriate 
use of state power. Socially minded businesses hoping to distinguish 
themselves in the marketplace can seek B Lab’s certification without 
the state’s imprimatur. 
CONCLUSION 
Perhaps the best argument that can be made for benefit LLCs is 
that unincorporated businesses should not be excluded from 
competitive advantages offered by the state-sponsored “benefit” label 
that has already been made available to their corporate counterparts. 
And given the widespread adoption of benefit corporation statutes, it 
is simply too late to take the statutory “benefit” designation away 
from corporations, so it may as well be made available to LLCs.357   
 
Corp certification), could meet and exceed the stated goals of the benefit corporation 
statute.”). 
 353. See Molk, supra note 109, at 250–51 (describing the incentives of a third-party 
certifier to ensure the accuracy of its certification); Murray, Choose Your Own Master, 
supra note 2, at 45 (“Private organizations are better equipped than state governments to 
build nuanced brands and to police them.”); Murray, Social Enterprise Innovation, supra 
note 4, at 363 (“[P]rivate organizations like B Lab are better equipped than the 
government to successfully brand social enterprises.”). 
 354. See Dorff, Assessing the Assessment, supra note 21, at 525 (describing the 
documentation and auditing requirements of B Corporation certification). 
 355. See Molk, supra note 109, at 250–51. 
 356. See supra notes 306–07 and accompanying text. 
 357. See Murray, Beneficial Benefit LLCs?, supra note 7, at 442 (articulating a version 
of this argument). 
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This argument is pragmatic, but also defeatist. It concedes that 
the unneeded and ill-advised innovation of statutory benefit 
corporations is irreversible and, therefore, should be allowed to 
metastasize into the LLC realm. 
When legislatures enact statutes that explicitly authorize certain 
businesses to advance public benefit and grant those businesses the 
“benefit” label, it creates a false dichotomy.358 It suggests that 
conventional corporations and LLCs do not benefit the public, that 
such businesses are “detriment” entities. Of course, that is wrong. All 
statutory business forms, including conventional corporations and 
LLCs, must ultimately benefit the public.359 Otherwise, legislators—
elected representatives of the public—would not have enacted (or 
would now amend or repeal) the statutes authorizing their creation. 
This fundamental reality is masked by benefit entity legislation. 
But if the repeal of existing benefit corporation statutes is 
improbable, and if the spread of benefit LLCs is predestined, then it 
is the responsibility of legislators to draft or amend these statutes to 
create true accountability for businesses that claim the state-
sponsored “benefit” moniker. Most fundamentally, benefit entity 
statutes must give stakeholders other than an entity’s owners say in 
the business and its governance.360 
Recently, several scholars have made various thoughtful 
proposals along these lines. For example, Haskell Murray has 
proposed requiring every benefit corporation to adopt a stakeholder 
advisory board composed of representatives of various stakeholders 
and vested with limited, but enforceable, rights in the governance of 
the business.361 Similarly, Alicia Plerhoples has suggested granting 
nonshareholder stakeholders enforceable legal rights in the form of a 
veto power over certain business decisions as well as standing to bring 
benefit enforcement proceedings against a benefit corporation’s 
 
 358. See Blount & Offei-Danso, supra note 43, at 659. 
 359. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, SEC Commissioner Hester Price Says Corporate Law 
Is Public Interest Law, Which Is True, but I Said It First!, PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM 
(Oct. 2, 2018), http://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2018/10/sec-
commissioner-hester-pierce-says-corporate-law-is-public-interest-law-which-is-true-but-i-
said-it.html [https://perma.cc/5KKD-3EW5]. 
 360. See Strine, The Dangers of Denial, supra note 103, at 792 (“If we believe that 
other constituencies should be given more protection within corporation law itself, then 
statutes should be adopted giving them enforceable rights that they can wield.”). 
 361. See Murray, Adopting Stakeholder Advisory Boards, supra 204, at 94–105. 
Importantly, Professor Murray limits his proposal, recommending that stakeholder 
advisory boards be mandatory only for large or publicly traded social enterprises. Id. at 
105–06. 
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board.362 Taking a different approach, Emily Winston has proposed 
every benefit corporation be required to work with nonshareholding 
stakeholders to coauthor a concrete public benefit plan that those 
stakeholders could later seek to enforce against the business.363 
Building on these various proposals, Brett McDonnell has also 
emphasized that no one approach will be suitable for all social 
enterprises and that stakeholder empowerment must be tailored to an 
individual business’s unique circumstances and needs.364 
The upshot of all these proposals is that for benefit entity 
statutes to accomplish their intended purpose, the law must empower 
stakeholders in a way that current benefit entity statutes abjectly fail 
to. Otherwise, benefit entities are no different than conventional 
entities: beholden to the desires of their owners, which desires may or 
may not involve the pursuit of public benefit, whatever that concept 
might mean to the owners. In the absence of legislative initiative to 
reform benefit entity statutes, the onus is on academics and other 
neutrals to pierce through the feel-good rhetoric and educate the 
public about the emptiness of the state-created “benefit” designation 



















 362. See Alicia E. Plerhoples, Social Enterprise as Commitment: A Roadmap, 48 
WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 89, 127–31 (2015). 
 363. See Winston, supra note 39, at 1832–40. 
 364. See Brett H. McDonnell, From Duty and Disclosure to Power and Participation in 
Social Enterprise, 70 ALA. L. REV. 77, 84 (2018). 
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